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NOTE 
Insuring R u.de 11 Sanction.§ 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires courts to sanction at-
torneys who file frivolous papers . I Since 1983, when the rule ·was 
amended, attorney sanctions have emerged as an increasingly signifi-
cant aspect of civil litigation in the United States. Estima tes of the 
number of rule 11 decisions appearing in the past six years range from 
600 to over 1000, 2 and the monetary sanctions awarded in these cases 
have reached amounts as high as $200,000 to $300,000.3 As the 
! . The text of F ED. R. C!v. P. II reads as follow s: 
Every pleadin g, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an att o rney shall be 
signed by a t least one attorney of record in the atto rney's individual name, whose address 
sha ll be sta ted. A party who is not represented by an atto rn ey shall sign the party's plead-
in g, moti on, or o ther paper and s tate the party's address. Except when o therwise specifi-
ca lly provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verifi ed or accompani ed by affidavit. 
The rule in equity that th e averments of an answer under oath musi be overcome by the 
testimony of two witnesses o r of one witness sustained by corrobora ting circ umstances is 
abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certifi cate by the signer that 
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; th a t to the best of the s igner's 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in 
fac t and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, m odifica-
ti on, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed fo r any improper purpose, such 
as to harass or to ca use unnecessary delay o r needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a 
pleading, motion , or other paper is not signed , it shall be stricken unless it is signed 
promptly after the omission is called to the attenti on of the pleader o r movant. If a plead-
ing, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court , upon motion or upon 
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it , a represented party , or both , 
an appropriate san ct ion, which may include an order to pay to the o th er party or parties the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, m o tion, or 
o ther paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
2. Joseph, Th e Trouble wi1h Rule 11: Uncerlain S IQndards and Mandatory Sanclions. 73 
A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1987, at 87, 88 (over 1000 rule 11 decisions); Proceedings of !he For1y-Eigl11h 
Judicial Confe rence of !he District of Columbia Circuit, 119 F.R. D . 461 , 584 ( 198 7) (statement of 
Howard Will ens) (over 1000 decisions interpreting rul e II); Sc hwarze r, Rule II R evisiled. 10 1 
HARV. L. R EV. 101 3 (1988) [hereinafte r Schwarzer, Rule 11 R evisiled] (more than 600 decisions 
enforcing rule 11); Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F R. D. 189 , 234 (1 988) (688 reported 
cases on rul e 11 fro m 1983 to 1987; approximately 200 cases annu all y since 1985); N ote, A 
Umform Approach 10 Rule II Sanclions, 97 YALE L.J. 901 (1 988) (ova 1000 rul e 11 cases). Th e 
number of unreported deci sions and informal invoca tions of rule i 1 may be many times large r 
tha n those repo rted . S ee, e.g., THIRD CIRCUIT T ASK FO RCE ON fE DERAL RU LE OF C IVIL PR O-
CEDURE II, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION 59 (1989) [hereinafter RULE ]] IN TRANSITION] (finding 
survey data in the Third Circuit confirming that reported decisions a re onl y the "tip of the 
iceberg" with respect to use of rule II). 
3. Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548 (9th C ir. 1986) (affirming sanction of 
$294,141.1 0), ccrt. denied, 108 S. Ct. 83, 85 (1987); Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 
111 F .RD. 637 (S.D. N .Y. 1986) (imposing $200,000 in san ctions), modified, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (affirming $ 100,000 sanction against attorn eys, but vacatin g $ 100,000 sanction against 
client), cerl. granted sub tzom., Pavelic & Leflo re v. Marvel Enterta in ment Gro up, 109 S. C t. 
1116 (1989) ; cf In re Yagma n, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir.) ( reversing $250,000 sanction), opinion 
am ended, 803 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied. 108 S. C t. 450 (1 987). Many other cases 
involve lesser, though still no t insubstantial , sanction awards. Sec, e.g. , Inte rn a tional Shipping 
Co. v. H ydra Offshore, Inc. , 875 F. 2d 388 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming sa nc tion o f $ 10,000 ); Truck 
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number and size of rule 11 sanctions have grown, so has the interest of 
the bench and bar. Judicial conferences of federal circuits have con-
ducted symposia and organized task forces on rule 11 ,4 and numerous 
articles discussing the rule have appeared in law reviews and bar publi-
cations. 5 The burgeoning literature has analyzed nearly every aspect 
of rule 11, from the standards that the rule establishes to the scope of 
judicial review that sanction orders merit. 
One important but overlooked aspect of rule 11, hmvever, looms 
on the horizon: Can and should attorneys insure against their poten-
tial liability for rule 11 sanctions? Although courts have not yet con-
fronted this question, they may very well need to do so in coming 
years. T he proliferation of sanctions presents attorneys with consider-
able risk. Judges are sanctioning a broad range of attorney behavior, 
making it unclear exactly what conduct is sanctionable under the 
rule. n Faced with the uncertain potential liability for sanctions, attor-
neys will likely seek insurance protection. Indeed, a few attorneys 
have already begun to pursue coverage for sanctions under their ex-
isting professional liability policies. 7 
Treads, Inc .. v. Armstrong Rubber Co. , 868 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1989) (affirming sanction of 
$12,630.62); Chapman & Cole v. !tel Container Inti. B.V., 865 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1989) (af-
firming sanction of 520,000); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Association of Flight 
Attendants, 864 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (affirming sanctions of $23 , 106.89); King v. Idaho 
Funeral Serv. Assn., 862 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming sanction of S 10,000); Hays v. Sony 
Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming sanction of $14,895.46 against a sole 
practitioner from a small town); Orange Prod. Credit Assn. v. Frontline Ventures Ltd. , 792 F.2d 
797 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming sanction of $54,002.52); In re Ginther, 791 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 
1986) (affirming $52,000 in sanctions); Carlton v. Jolly, 125 F.R.D. 423 (E.D. Va. 1989) (impos-
ing S 12,500 in sanctions); Gutterman v. Eimicke, 125 F.R.D. 348 (E.D. N .Y. 1989) (imposing 
$12,555 in sanctions); Anschutz Petroleum Mktg. Corp. v. E.W. Saybo1t & Co., 112 F.R.D. 355 
(S. D.N. Y. 1986) (imposing sanction of $32,00 l. 98). A recent survey of rule 11 opinions revealed 
that the average rule 11 sanction is $44,118 and the median sanction is $5,153. T. WII.LGING, 
THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 30, 80 ( 1988). 
4. See, e.g., Proceedings of !he Forly-Eig!Jih Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia 
Cirelli!, supra note 2; RULE 11 IN TRANSITION, supra note 2; cf NEW YORK STATE BAR Asso-
CI.-\TIOl" COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS, SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES (1987). 
5. See. e.g .. Carter, The His wry and Putposes of Rule II, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 4 ( 1985); 
Joseph, Rule 11 is Only !he Beginning. A.B.A. J., May 1, 1988, at 62; Maute, Sanctions: Are 
They Changing !he Liligation Game Rules?. TRIAL, Oct. 1988, at 67: Nelken, Sanelions Under 
Amended Federal Rule I1 -Some "Chilling" Problems in 1he S!rugglc Between Compensation 
and Punishm ent, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986); Parness, More Slringent Sanctions Under Federal 
Civil Rule 1I: A Reply 10 Professor Nelken . 75 GEO. L.J. 1937 (1987); Pope & Benkoczy, A 
Comprehensive Guide 10 Sane/ions Under Rule 11. 55 DEF. COUNS. J. 389 ( 1988); Schwarzer, 
Sancrions Under The New Federal Rule 11 -A Closer Look. 104 F.R.D. 18 1 ( 1985) [hereinafter 
Schwarzer, Sanctions: A Closer Look]; Schwarzer, Rule 1I Revisited, supra note 2; Vairo, supra 
note 2; Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sane/ions, 100 HARV. L. 
REv. 630 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Plausible Pleadings]; Note, Applying Rule I 1 to Rid Courts of 
Frivolous Li1igation Without Chilling the Bar:> Crealivily, 76 KY. L. J. 891 (1987-88) [hereinafter 
Note, Applying Rule 1 1]; Note, The Dynamics of Rule I 1: Preventing Frivolous LiligrJtion by 
Demanding Professional Responsibilily, 61 N.Y. U. L. REv. 300 (1986) [hereinafter Note, The 
Dynamics of Rule I1]; Note, supra note 2. 
6. See infra notes 12-13, 25-50 and accompanying text. 
7. See RULE 11 IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 127 (Out of 34 attorneys surveyed who had 
been in vo lved in sanction motions, one attorney is filing a claim for coverage of sanctions im -
346 fl. f ichigan Law R eview (Vol. 88 :344 
Can these and other attorneys find coverage for sanctions under 
their existing policies? Should they be allowed to obtain coverage for 
sanctions at all? This Note addresses these questions and attempts to 
sketch the landscape surrounding the looming issue of insurance cov-
erage for rule 11 sanctions. To determine whether sanctions can and 
should be insurable, it is necessary first to understand the scope of the 
risk of rule 11 sanctions. Part I of this Note outlines the unsettled 
standards, purposes, and practices of rule 11 that make insuring sanc-
tions both attractive and problematic. 8 As discussed in Part I, judges' 
views vary widely both as to what conduct is sanctionable and as to 
what type of sanctions to impose. M any attorneys, therefore, cannot 
be certain whether their actions will be subject to costly sanctions . 
To alleviate this uncertainty, attorneys concerned with the growing 
risk of rule 11 sanctions are likely to seek insurance coverage. Parts II 
and HI of this Note explore two potential sources of insurance cover-
age for sanctions. The first place attorneys will look for coverage will 
be in existing professionai liability policies. Part II, therefore, exam-
ines whether current attorney professional liability policies cover rule 
11 sanctions and concludes that, depending on the doctrine of inter-
pretation used, courts could find that some of these policies cover rule 
11 sanctions. 9 Even if existing policies do not cover such sanctions, 
however, attorneys may still seek, and insurers may offer, separate pol-
icies specifically designed to cover rule 11 sanctions. Part III, there-
fore, discusses the market requirements of insurability and shows that 
insurers may willingly offer special rule 11 insurance fo r attorneys. 10 
Given the potential fo r rule 11 insurance coverage under either ex-
isting or new policies, should courts enforce such policies? Part IV 
considers this question and the public policy issues raised by insurance 
coverage of rule 11 sanctions. 1 1 This final Part concludes that, at least 
for now, rule 11 insurance should be allowed and enforced by the 
courts . The ultimate resolution of the public policy issues presented 
by rule 11 insurance will depend on the role that the rule is to play in 
civil litigation; however, at the present time this role is far from clear. 
Absent a consensus on the purpose and scope of rule 11, any attempt 
to prohibit rule 11 insurance on public policy grounds will be prema-
posed against h im. ); telepho ne intervi'" \\. wiih Rebe rt Cubbin. C o un sel fo r Micl1iga n La wyers 
Mutual Ins urance Co . (Scp:cmber 1. l q8 8) (In riJc pst yea r. two attorn eys have notified com -
pany of potential clain1 s for sanc ti ons.). Fu n h~rrn o re , t\VO briLf anic les on the cover3gc of san c-
t io ns under profession a l li ab ilit y po lici es ha 1 e appea red in insura nce law journals, po rtending a 
growin g int erest by atto rn eys and ;n sure rs in th t.: in su rabi!i:y issue. Hamilton, Mc K ee & Levitt, 
!nsurabili1y of Monewry San Ciions Under .-iuoritey J:::rrors and Omissions Policies. 5~- D El '. 
CouNS. J. 520 (1987): Th omsen , l nsurana Col'cragc fo r So noions Imposed Under Amended 
Federal R ule 11. 38 F EDN . INS. & CO!W CO U'S Q. 29.3 (1 9 88). 
8. See infra notes 12-84- and accompa nying tn t 
9. See itzfra notes 85 -!50 and accom pa ny tn g text. 
10. See infra notes 151-82 a nd accompanying tex t. 
11 . See infra not es 183·250 a nd acco mpa n ying text. 
I 
I 
\ 
J 
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ture. Moreover, insurance coverage for sanctions would make a posi-
tive contribution in its own right to the functioning of rule 11. 
Insurance would advance the compensatory ends of the rule, and it 
would alleviate any chilling of creative advocacy caused by the rule. 
The availability of insurance coverage would foster a better balance 
between the competing public policies of judicial efficiency and vigor-
ous, creative representation in the courts. 
I. THE RISK OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
Practicing law under rule 11 has been variously described as "ne-
gotiating a minefield" 12 or playing a game of Russian roulette. 13 
Although these metaphors may sound extreme, they capture the es-
sence of the risk of rule 11 sanctions. Attorneys today face the possi-
bili ty of being sanctioned without knowing in advance what type of 
behavior a particular judge will find violates the rule. The standards 
of conduct under rule 11 lack uniformity and certainty, and the sanc-
tions that can be imposed are discretionary with the court. Moreover, 
neither courts nor commentators agree on the purpose of rule 11 sanc-
tions, and this lack of consensus has led to uneven, and at times incon-
sistent, application of the rule. 
The growing uncertainty over attorney sanctions stems from the 
1983 amendments to rule 11. Before that time, the rule posed little 
risk because courts rarely invoked it. 14 The former rule 11 required 
attorneys to sign each pleading filed with the court, thereby certifying 
that the pleading was well-grounded and "not interposed for delay." 15 
Courts could strike pleadings signed with the "intent" to violate rule 
11 16 and could discipline attorneys who willfully violated the rule. 17 
Courts seldom used the former rule, however, because it applied only 
to pleadings; it required a showing of bad faith ; and it provided for 
only two limited sanctions. 18 
12. Joseph, supra not e 2, a t 89. 
13. M a ndelbaum, Amended Rule II: Despite Wide Application, Lillie Consensus Observed, 3 
iNSIDE LITIGAT ION (P-H) I, 18 (Jul y 1989 ) (quoting Professor George Cochra n, Univer;, ity of 
Mississippi). 
14. See Risinge r, Honesty in Pleading and It s Enforcem ent: Some "St riking" Problems with 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure II. 61 M INN. L. R EV. I, 34- 37 (1976) (onl y 23 cases repor ted 
from 1938 to 1976 in whic h sanct ions were so ught ; rule !I was fo und to have been viola ted in 
on ly II of th ese c;1ses) . 
15. FED. R. C tv. i'. I I (1980) (amended 1983 ). 
16. !d. 
17. !d. See also Carter, supra note 5, a t 7-8 (fo rmer rule II on ly au th orized two typ.:s of 
sanctions: striking pl eadi ngs and disciplining a tto rneys). 
18. See Nelkcn, supra note 5, at 13 15-16 (former rule II rare ly in"o ked because of" 'mea n-
in gless sanctions' a nd 'soft sta ndards'" ); Oliphant , R ule 11 San u ions and Standards. 12 WM. 
M ITCH ELl. L. REv. 73 1, 735 ( 1986) (difficulty of meeting burden of bad fa ith under fe rme r rul e); 
Schwarzer, Sanctions: A Closer Look, supra note 5, at 183 (form er rule II ra rely invoked because 
"s triking of a pleading was an ineffect ive pena lty"). See generally Carter. supra note 5, a t 4-9. 
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The 1983 amendments, however, expanded the scope of rule 11 
and strengthened courts' ability to enforce it .19 Under the nev; rule, 
attorneys must sign, in addition to pleadings, all motions and other 
papers filed with the court. An attorney's signature now certifies that 
the attorney has read the paper and that - "to the best of [the attor-
ney's] knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable in -
quiry" - the paper is well-grounded in fact, warranted by existing law 
or a good fai th extension of existing law, and not filed fo r any im-
proper purpose such as harassment or delay. 20 The amended rule gen-
erally replaces the subjective standard of the former rule with an 
objective one of "reasonableness under the ci rcumstances. " 2 1 It also 
requires the court, on the motion of a party or on its own initiative,22 
to impose "an appropriate sanction" on attorneys who sign papers in 
violation of the rule. 2 3 
P redicting what a particular court will find " reasonable" or "ap-
propriate," though, is an uncertain undertaking.24 By expanding rule 
11 's standards and giving courts discretion to craft a variety of sanc-
tions, the drafters of the 1983 amendments created a new risk for at-
to rneys practicing in the federal courts. In addition, by failing to 
explicate clearly the role that rule 11 sanctions should play in civil 
litigation, the drafters failed to give courts the guidance needed to ap-
ply the rule uniformly and thereby to minimize uncertainty. 
A. Broad S tandards 
The new rule imposes three requirements on attorneys for every 
paper they sign and file in court. First, attorneys must make a reason-
able inquiry into the facts underlying their papers' assertions. Second, 
they must make a reasonable inquiry into the underlying law to deter-
mine that their papers are supported by existing law or a " good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." 
19. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 11 adv iso ry committee's note (exp la ining that a greater range of 
ci rcumstances would constitute a vio lat io n of the new ru le and desc ri bing the expansion of avail -
able sanc tions). 
20. FED. R . Ctv. P. 11 . 
2 1. FED. R. C tv. P. 11 ad visory co mmittee·s no te ("'The sta nda rd is o ne of reasonableness 
unde r the c ircumsta nces."). See infra no tes 25 -50 a nd acco m pa nyin g text. Des pite the object ive 
sta ndard of the amended ru le, it is co nceivable tha t, in pract ice, judges on ly impose sanct ions 
where an attorney h as violated the rule in bad faith. Empirical resea rc h on ru le 11, however, 
does not reveal such a prac ti ce. SeeS. KASSI N, AN Ef\tP IRICAI. STU DY OF RU L E 11 SANCTim<s 
18-23 (1985) (60% of the judges surveyed who perceived a " non willful" violation of rule 11 st ill 
imposed sanctions of attorneys ' fees; 53% of the judges wh o beli eved that rule 11 had been 
violated without "bad fa ith " st ill imposed sanctions) . 
22. See, e.g., Sni pes v. United States, 7 11 F. Supp. 827 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (sua sponte im posi -
tio n of sa nctio ns by cou rt). 
23. FED. R. C tv. P . 11. 
24. See Schwa rze r , Rule II Rel'isited, supra note 2, at 10 17 ('" (T ]here is good ground for 
a rg uing that the s tandard a co urt wi ll a ppiy und er ru ie ! l is unpredictable ."). 
November 1989] Note - Insuring Rule 11 Sanctions 349 
Third, they must not fi le papers for any improper purpose. 25 As 
straightforward as these requirements may seem, each has led to broad 
and uncertain standards for measuring compliance with the rule. 26 As 
this section demonstrates, judges do not agree on what conduct is 
sanctionable under the rule, 27 and attorneys can be sanctioned even 
when they file an objectively frivolous paper in good faith. 28 
The first and second requirements impose a broad obligation of 
reasonable inqui ry. 2 9 Attorneys must conduct the type of investiga-
tion that a " reasonable attorney" would make under the circum-
stances to assure that a paper is factuaily and legally supportable. 30 
Yet no matter what type of fac tual inquiry an attorney makes, argua-
bly he can always do more. 31 Moreover, in a common law system it 
can be difficult to find any argument that is neither ' \ varranted by 
existing law [n]or a good faith argument for the extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of existing law." 32 
25. On the requirements of rule II generally, see, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 
836 F.2d 866. 873-74 (5th Cir. !988) (en bane); Szabo Food Serv., lnc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 
F.2d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir. 1987). cerr. dismissed. 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988); Schwarzer, Sanctions: A 
Closer Look, supra note 5. at 184-85. 
26. See. e.g. , Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1986) (The standards for 
imposing sanctions "have not always been either clear or consistently applied."), cert. denied, 480 
U.S. 918 (1987); G. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 31 (1989) 
(The standards for sanctions are "uncertain."); Cavanagh, Developing Srandards Under Amended 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HoFSTRA L. REV. 499. S 14 (1986) ("[T]he 
new criteria for attorney conduct are somewhat amorphous.'"). 
27. See. e.g.. S. KASSIN, supra note 21, at 45 ("[T]here is a good deal of interjudge disagree-
ment over what actions constitute a violation of the rule.'"); RULE II IN TRANSITION, supra note 
2, at 95 (finding "inconsistent enforcement" of rule II in Third Circuit); Maute, supra note 5, at 
69 (noting "substantial disagreement"' among the courts over what conduct is sanctionable); 
Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, supra note 2, at 1016 (Different courts "have not applied the rule 
in the same way."). 
28. See. e.g.. East way Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243. 253 (2d Cir. 1985) 
("Simply put, subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did."). 
29. See. e.g.. 762 F.2d at 253 ("Rule 11 explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative 
duty on each anorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is 
signed."); G. JosEPH . supra note 26, at 97-98. 
30. See Cabell v. Petty , 810 F.2d 463. 466 (4 th Cir. ! 987) (test of rule 11 is "whether a 
reasonable attorney in like circumstances could believe his actions to be factually and legally 
justified"). Bul see·"· · M IL LER, THE AUGUST 1983 AiYlENDM ENTS TO THE FE DE RAL RUL ES Of 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 15 (Federal Judicial Center 1984) (The reasonable inquiry requirement "has 
got some subjective elements to it, but it is an attempt to become more objective."). 
31. See T. WILLGING, supra note 3, at 50. Indeed, some courts have suggested that attor-
neys have a continuing duty to investigate facts. See, e.g., Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 
F.2d 332, 335-36 (6th Cir. 1988) ("'[T]he reasonable inquiry required under Rule II is not a one-
time obligation .... [A party] is impressed with a continuing responsibility to review and reevalu-
ate his pleadings and where appropriate modify them to conform to R ule 11. "') . But see T homas 
v. Capital Sec. Servs., inc. , 836 F. 2d 866, 875 (5th C ir. 1988) ("[T]he review of an attorney's 
conduct for Rule ! l purposes is isolated to the moment the paper is signed .... ");Oliveri v. 
Thompson, 803 F2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Rule 11 applies only to the initial signing of a 
' pleading, motion or other paper.' '"), cert. denied. 480 U .S. 918 (1987). 
32. On the difflcul ty of determining whether a legal argument is frivolou s. see Levinson , 
Frivolous Casn: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything At A !!?, 24 OsGOODE H ALL L.J. 353 (1986). 
This difficulty is especially acute in areas of the law that are rapidly changing. See. e.g. , 
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What constitutes a reasonable inquiry will therefore vary from case 
to case and from judge to judge. 33 As the advisory committee ac-
knowledged, the reasonableness of an inquiry depends on a variety of 
factors: the amount of time an attorney had available; \Vhether the 
attorney had to rely on a client for information; whether the paper was 
based on a "plausible" legal argument; or vvhether the attorney de-
pended on co- counseL 34 In deciding whether conduct is sanctionable, 
judges may also be inftuenced by \Vhether the violation of the rule 'Nas 
n1alicious or simpiy care1e=~s. 35 Given these various factors) it is not 
surprising that some judges fir:d a particular type of behavior sanction~ 
able while others find it permissible. 36 As one federal judge has ob-
served, "what a judge will find to be objectively unreasonable is very 
much a matter of that judge's subjective determination." 37 
Like the first two requirements, the standard for the third require-
ment, that a paper not be interposed for any improper purpose, also 
introduces uncertainty. 38 Rule 11 states that fi ling a paper "to harass 
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of the 
litigation" constitutes improper purpose. 39 A lthough the rule does not 
mention bad faith or subjective intent,40 determining whether a paper 
was filed to harass or to cause delay presumably must involve some 
inquiry into the attorney's intent. 41 This can be di fficult to do, how-
ever, and subjective inquiries may contravene the objective standard 
Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, supra note 2, at 1017. Uncertainty over what courts regard as 
"warranted'" by existing law, that is. what constitutes a plausible argument under existing law, 
adds to rule 11 's risk. See Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 5, at 641 ("When courts use 
narrow or unclear standards of [legal] plausibility in applying rule 11, they increase the risk to 
lawyers of practicing simplified pleading."). 
33. See Elson & Rothschild, Rule I 1: Objectivity and Competence, 123 F.R.D. 361, 363 
(1988) ("[S]uch "objective' requirements as that there be 'reasonable inquiry· and that the plead-
ing be factually 'well grounded' and legally 'warranted" are hardly precise; each calls for the 
exercise of individual judgment by the parties and by the court."); cf Aminoil, Inc. v. United 
States, 646 F. Supp. 294. 298 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (observing in a different context that "'[w]hat may 
be considered reasonable by one court may be found unreasonable by another"). 
34. FED. R. Clv. P. 11 advisory committee·s note. See generally G. JosEPH. supra note 26, 
at 101-30, 140-57. 
35. See Schwarzer, Rule J I Rc>•isired, supra note 2, at 1016. 
36. See supra note 27. 
37. Schwarzer, Rule I I Revisiu:d, supra note 2, at 1016; see also G. JosEPH, supra note 26, at 
1. 
38. See generally Shaffer, Rule 1 I: Bright Light. Dim Future, in SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND 
OTHER POWERS 1, 10-11 (G. Joseph, P. Sandler & C. Shaffer 2d ed. 1988). 
39. FED. R. C!v. P. i 1. 
40. In fact, the <Jdvisory committee's note explicitly states that the new rule abandons the 
element of willfulness found in the former rule in favor of an objective test of "reasonableness 
under the circumstances ... fED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. 
41. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., lnc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(finding that. on remand, "the district court must find out why Szabo-Digby pursued this litiga-
tion"), cert. dismissed. 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988); Nelkcn, supra note 5, at 1320 (arguing that "the 
improper purpose standard requires that the court attempt to fathom the motives of the signer'"). 
.,. 
l 
i 
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intended by the drafters of the amended rule. 42 A number of courts 
and commentators have therefore adopted a purely objective approach 
to the improper purpose prong of rule 11. 4 ' In Zaldivar v. City of Los 
A ngeles, 44 for example, the Ninth Circuit held that regard less of the 
plaintiff attorney's state of mind, a defendant cannot be "harassed" 
under rule 11 as long as the complaint " complies with the 'well 
g tounded in fact and warran ted by existing b.w' clause of the R ule."45 
By this vievv, if the paper satisfies the first tv.;o req uirements of reason-
ablen,ess in fact and law, it then per se satisfies the thi rd requirement of 
proper purpose. 46 A ll aspects of rule 11 are then based on th·~ notion 
of " reasonableness." 
Although some courts dispute that rule 11 is completely objec-
tive,47 most agree that amended rule 11 has at least more of an objec-
tive standard than the previous ruleY' The amended rule, therefore, 
"is more stringent than the original good-faith formula and thus . . . a 
greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation. " 49 Attorneys 
can be - and are - sanctioned even when they act in good faith. 50 
42. See Schwarzer, Sane! ions: A Closer Look. supra note 5, a t 195-96 (describing the dangers 
and difficulties with a subjec tive approach to improper purpose). Bul see Nelken, supra note 5, at 
1321 n.51 ("The rulemakers, ... in incorpora tin g and ex panding the 'delay' provision of the old 
ru le, have retained its subjective element."). 
43. See, e.g .. Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F2d 1503, 1508 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[A) 
complaint that is well-grounded in fact and law cannot be sanctioned regardless of counsel's 
subjective intent."); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F2d !265, 1275 (2d Cir. !986) (rule ll contains 
no subjective element), eerl. denied, 480 U.S. 91 8 (1987); C ity of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 
649 F. Supp. 716, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[E]ven a bad faith motive does not justify Rule 11 
sanct ions, where ... the court has concl uded that the arguments advanced are not lacking in 
colorable legal support."); Schwarzer, Sane/ions: A Closer Look , supra note 5, at 196 ("If a 
reasonably clear legal justification can be shown for the filing of the paper in question, no im-
proper purpose can be found and sanctions are inappropriate.· ·). 
44. 780 F2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986). 
45. 780 F.2d at 832. 
46. Conversely, some cou rts and commentators infer improper purpose from the failure to 
sa ti sfy the first two requirements. See, e.g., Nesmith v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 833 F.2d 
1489, 1491 (llth Cir. 1987) (Rule 11 "incorporates an objective standa rd in assessing bad 
fa ith .. '); In re T Cl Ltd., 769 F. 2d 441,445 (7th Cir. 1985) (An a ttorney's behavior is improper if 
it is unreasonable.); Schwarzer, Sane1ions: A Closer Look , supra note 5, a t 196 (improper purpose 
objectively measured by unreasonable behavior). 
47. See, e.g., Szabo F ood Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th C ir. 1987) 
(Rule ll retain s a "subjecti ve component."), eer1. dismissed. 108 S. Ct. l iO l (198 8); Robinson v. 
National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 11 30 (5th Cir. 1987) (Papers well· grounded in fact 
and law may sti ll viola te the improper purpose cla use of rule ll.); Terpstra v. Farmers & 
Merchants Bank, 634 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. lnd. 198 5) (plaintiffs sanctioned for filing suit in bad 
faith) . Sec generally G. JOS EPH, supra note 26, at 184 -86 (discussing circuit split on the standard 
for improper purpose). 
48. See. e.g.. Thornton v. Wah l, 787 F2d 1151 , 1154 (7th Cir. 1986) ("An empty head but a 
pure hea rt is no defense."); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F. 2d 11 68 , 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(ru le 11 in corporates an object ive standard); Shaffer. supra note 38 , at 2· 3 (' ·[I)t is now settled 
that subjective good faith is not enough."); Note. The Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 5, at 315-
16 (courts generally recognize objective s tandard). 
49. FED. R. Crv. P. ll adviso ry committee's note. 
50. See. e.g .. Thom1011, 787 F.2d at 1154 (7th Cir. 1986) (attorney sanctioned in the absence 
i 
j 
-1 
j 
i ,, 
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Their actions are now judged against those of the proverbial, but none-
theless ambiguous, " reasonable" attorney. 
B. Varied Sanctions 
Whenever a court finds that an attorney has violated rule 11, it 
must impose an appropriate sanction.5 1 Although the rule mandates 
sanctions, it gives courts considerable discretion in determining when 
to sanction 5 2 and what type and amount of sanction to impose. 53 This 
discretion adds a further element of uncertainty to rule 11 sanctions. 
In addition to not knowing exactly what conduct is sanctionable, indi-
vidual attorneys are unable to anticipate the type or amount of sanc-
tions a particular court might impose. 54 
Rule 11 states that an appropriate sanction may include payment 
of the reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees incurred by the ag-
of " subjec ti ve purpose to missta te law"); Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F .2d l 217 (6 th Cir. 1986) 
(attorn ey sanctioned in the absence o f a findin g of bad faith) ; East way Constr. Corp. v. C ity of 
New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (sa me). 
51. FED. R. Crv. P. II ("If a pleading, moti on o r o ther paper is signed in violatio n of this 
rule, the court , upon a motion or upon its own initiative, sh all impose ... an appro priate sanc-
tion. " ); see also Wesmwre!and, 770 F.2d at 1174 (" [T]he new provision that the court 'shall 
impose' sanctio ns mandates the imposition of sanctio ns when warranted by groundl ess or abusive 
practices.") ; Nelken, supra note 5, at 1321 ("[R]ule II makes sanction s mandatory." ). By man-
dating sanctions, the rule is "intended to reduce the relucta nce of courts to impose sanction s." 
FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory committee's note . 
52. Courts have imposed rule II sanctions on attorneys, law firms, a nd clients. See, e. g., Chu 
v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1985) (a ttorney sanctioned); Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment 
Group, 650 F. Supp . 684 (S.D .N.Y. 1986) (a ttorn ey and law firm sancti oned); Robinson v. Na-
tional Cash R egister Co., 808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. l 987) (att orney and cli ent sanctioned); Chev-
ron, U.S.A. v. Hand, 763 F.2d 11 84 (lOth Cir. 19 85) (cli ent sanctio ned). See generally Nelken , 
supra note 5, at 1329 (a 1985 survey of 100 rul e 11 cases found that attorn eys were sanctioned in 
38% of the cases; clients in 29 % ; and both in 18 % ). Th e fact that a court can sanction a client 
rai ses the ques tion of whether such sancti ons are insurable under the cli ent 's liability policies. 
Although this Note is limited to the ques tion of insuring a ttorney sanction s, some of the analysis 
provid ed here may be applicable to sanctions against c lients. Additi o na ll y, the anal ys is con-
tain ed in this Note would apply to situations where sanctioned clients sec k recovery from their 
atto rneys. The questions presented by these la tter situa tions include wh eth er sa nctioned c lients 
may recover from their a ttorneys for malpractice and, if so, whether th e attorneys may be indem-
nified by their professional liabilit y insurers. A num ber of such indirec t cla ims for coverage of 
rule 11 sanctions have apparently been made. Telephone interview with James D. H adfi eld, 
Counsel for Lawyers Mutual Insurance Co. (California) (Feb. 9, 1989). These in d irec t claims 
raise issues of in surability similar to those addressed in this N ote. 
53. See, e. g., FED. R. Ci v . P. II ad visory committee 's note (Th e court "has discretion to 
tailo r sanctions to the pa rticular facts of the case.") ; Insurance Benefit Adminrs. , Inc. v. Martin, 
871 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir. 1989) (district court may impose wide range o f san ctions); Eas tway 
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York , 762 F.2d 243, 254 n. 7 (2d Cir. 1985) ("(D]istrict courts 
retain broad discreti on in fashioning sanctions . ... " ). Rule II only requires that sanctions be 
"appropria te. " See, e.g., In re Yagman, 796 F. 2d 116 5, 1184- 85, opinion am ended, 803 F.2d 
1085 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. C t. 450 ( 1987); Schwarzer, San ctions: A Closer Look, 
supra note 5, a t 202-03 . 
54. Cf Note, supra note 2, at 911-12 ("Judicial use of d ifferen t meth ods to cal cul a te mone-
tary sanctions is a source of disparit y, injecting an element of a rbitra riness int o Rule 1 l 
cases.") . 
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grieved party, 55 but this is by no means the only sanction available. 
Courts have imposed a variety of nonmonetary sanction actions, in-
cluding reprimanding attorneys, 56 st riking pleadings or papers, 57 
barring attorneys from appearing in the court, 5 8 and referring attor-
neys to state disciplinary boards . 59 By far the majority of cases, how-
ever, involve m onetary sanctions.60 Even though most courts assess 
reasonablr~ exper::;es and attorneys' fees, the method of calculating 
these costs for rule 11 purposes is imprecise. 6 1 Moreover, some courts 
impose monetary sanctions that bear no relation to the expenses and 
attorneys' fees of the opposing p3.rty .62 
55. F EIJ. R. Clv. P. 11: see also M iller & C ulp, Litig01ion Cosls. Delay Prompled Th e New 
Rules of Civil Procedu re. Nat!. L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24, co l. I ("The new rules are intended to 
make anyone who impro vidently signs a document . .. bea r t he expenses incurred by the adver-
sa ry in dea lin g wit h it"). 
56. See, e.g . In re Curl, 803 F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[T]h c public admonishment 
of thi s opinion is sufficient sa nction.") ; Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 48 2 (3d Cir. Jn7) 
("[C]o urts may sanc tion by warnin g, o ra l repri mands in open court, or written admonition.''): 
Schwarze r, SanCiions: A Closer Look, supra note 5, at 201-02 (reprimand o r published order as 
san ctio n). 
57. T he authority to strike pleadin gs was explicit in the o ld rule ll , bu t is theo retically sti ll 
ava il ab le under the general language of "appropriate sanction" in th e amended rul e. See. e.g., 
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., In c., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988) (en ban e) (" [D]is tri c t 
courts may th eoretically still dismiss baseless claims or defenses as sanct ions . . . "); Schwarze r, 
Sanelions: A Closer Look. supra note 5, a t 204. This type of sanction , though, tends to punish 
the client for the a ttorney's behavior. 
58. See, e.g., Kendr ick v. Zandides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, ! 173 (N.D. Ca l. 1985) (Schwarzer, J.) 
(orde ring attorney to show cause wh y he should not be suspended from practicing in the North-
ern Di strict of California) ; In re Curl, 803 F.2d at 1007 (dictum) ("Th e cou rt will not hesitate to 
sanction future negligence with substantial mon etary fines, suspension , o r disbarment from prac-
ti ce before our court."). 
59. See. e.g., Lep ucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 89 (7th Cir.) (refe rring attorney to state 
disciplinary body for inves tigation), cerl. denied, 474 U.S. 827 (1985). 
60. G. JOSE PH , supra no te 26, at 225 ; S. KASS IN. supra note 21, a t 40; Nnv YORK STATE 
BAR ASSOCJ ,\TION COMM ITTEE ON FEDERAL COU RTS, supra note 4, at 15, 23: R ULE ]] IN 
TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 36-3 9; Bloomenstein, Developing Slandards for !he Imposilion of 
Sanclions Under Rule I! of !he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 21 AKRON L. REv. 289, 291 
n.ll ( 1988); Vairo , supra note 2, at 227. 
6 1. See, e.g .. N EW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIAT ION COMMiTTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS, 
supra note 4, :1t 38-40: Levin & Sobel, Achieving Balance in ;he Developing Law of Sanclions. 36 
Cc\TH . U. L REV . 587. 598-99 (19 87) . 
62. See, e.g .. Na tion a l Assn. o f Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R. D. 543, 559 (N .D. 
Cal. 1987 ) (imposing, in add ition to reasonable expenses and fees of $ 105,000, a S 15,000 sanc ti on 
payable to the cle rk of the court "for the unnecessa ry consumption of the court's time and re-
sources"); Robin son v. M oses, 644 F. Supp. 975, 982-83 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (imposing a $3600.00 
sanct;on , pa yable to the c lerk o f the court "for the waste of judicial resources"); East way Constr. 
Corp. v. C it y of New York, 821 F. 2d 121 (2d C ir. 1987) (where reasonable attorneys' fees 
amounted to :550,000, court imposed sanction of only $10,000); Doyle v. United States, 877 F.2d 
1235 (5th Cir.) (whe re reaso nable attorneys' fees amounted to $1 ,554.8 8, court imposed sanction 
of thi s amount indiv iduall y on all twenty-five plain tiffs) , cerr. denied, 1 OS S. C t. 159 ( 1987): 
Thornt on v. Wahl , 787 F.2d 11 51 (7th Cir.) (i mposing sanct ion of reasonab le attorneys' fees a nd 
double costs), cerl. denied, 479 U.S. 85 1 (19 86) . In addition, some courts have adopted the 
position that. notwit hstandin g actual ex penses and fees, a sanction shou ld be only as severe as 
necessa ry to ac hieve its purpose. See. e.g., Thom as v. Capital Sec . Scrvs. , Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878 
(5 th Ci r. 1988) (e n ban e): Cabell v. Pett y, 8 10 F.2d 463, 466 (4t h Cir. 1987); Brown v. Federatio n 
of Sta te Medical Bds., 830 F. 2d 1429, 143 7 (7th C ir. 1987). 
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C. fl/fultiple Purposes 
U ltimately what makes conduct sanctionable, and then v/hat 
makes a particular sanct ion appropriate, depends on the purpose of 
rule 11.63 Do rule 11 sanctions serve the purpose of punishing or of 
deterring violators of ru le 11? Or shouJd they compensate parties who 
are forced to respond to friv olous papers? As this section d-emon -
strates, courts and com menta tors have yet to agree on the proper 
\Veight to be given the ainls of lJunishment, deterrence, and cornpens.2~ ·~ 
tion in deciding rule 11 cases. 
A ll three of these purposes are rooted in the concerns which led to 
the amendment of the rule. In the years leading up to the 1983 
amendments, the bench and bar had become increasingly concerned 
with a litigation explosion in general and with abuse of the litigation 
process in particular. 64 Professor Arthur M iller, the reporter for the 
Federal R ules Advisory Committee that drafted the 1983 amend-
ments, described the concerns about litiga tion abuse as follows: 
There is a widespread feeling that there is a lot of frivolous conduct on 
the part of lawyers out there, a lot of vexatious conduct, a lot of ineffi -
cient conduct. . . . F rivolous motions are made and there is frivolous or 
vexatious discovery. I repeat , we do not know how much of this there 
really is, because what one person would call frivolous, somebody else 
would call meaningful or substantive .. .. We really don't know, but the 
advisory committee - composed of your colleagues on the district 
courts, a couple of court of appeals judges, and some distinguished trial 
lawyers from around the country - felt that there had to be some mean-
ingful restraint put on lawyer behavior to cut out some of this type of 
conduct. 65 
The advisory committee sought restraint on lawyer behavior to make 
the judicial process more efficient. Former rule 11, however, had "not 
been effective in deterring abuses" 66 because it covered only those in·· 
stances where attorneys intentionally filed frivolous pleadings and in-
cluded only a limited range of sanctioning mechanisms. 67 
T he new rule aims at reducing "the reluctance of courts to impose 
sanctions," thereby d iscouraging "dilatory or abusive tactics" and 
helping " to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous 
claims or defenses. " 68 Most courts and commentators agree that 
63. See Th omas, 836 F.2d at 878; G. JosEPH, supra note 26, a t 30-31 ; T. WJLLGl NG, supra 
note 3, at 25. 
64. See, e.g., Address by Chief Just ice W arren Burger, National Conference on the Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction with th e Ad ministration of Justice (April 7, 1976), reprinled in 70 
F .R.D. 79, 91 (1976) ("'Correc t or not, there is a lso a widespread feeling that the legal profess ion 
and judges are overly toleran t of lawyers who exploit th e inh erently contentious aspects of the 
adversary system to their own private advantage at public expense."). 
65. A. MILLER, supra note 30, a t 11-1 2. 
66. FED. R. Crv. P. ! I advisory committee's note. 
67. See supra notes 14-1 8 and accompan ying tex t. 
68. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 ad visory com mittee 's not e. 
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amended rule ll is generally designed to deter attorneys from filing 
frivoious and vexatious papers. 69 Yet by itself, the goal of deterrence 
offers little guidance to judges decidir;g rule 11 cases. 70 As one com-
mentator has noted: 
The undifferentiated desires to " discou rage dilatory or abusive tactics 
and help to st ream iine the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims 
or defenses," ... are little more than state·ments of ide2ls o r exhortations 
to decency and right conduct. T hey are no t di sputable. N or are they 
terribly helpful to a judge faced with the guestioD whet her or how to 
sanction specific behavior. 71 
Deterrence as an underlying policy is not a particularly helpful guide 
in determining what type of sanction a court should impose because 
any type of sanction will have some deterrent effect. Indeed, using 
sanctions to achieve either of the other purposes generally attributed 
to rule 11, namely compensation or punishment, will invariably have 
the additional consequence of deterring some frivolous behavior. 72 
Courts and commentators disagree about whether and to what ex-
tent the rule should serve the independent purposes of compensation 
or punishment. 73 Professor Miller, for example, has argued that rule 
11 sanctions should serve compensatory goals: "Although denomi-
nated a sanction provision, in reality [sanctions are] more appropri-
ately characterized as a cost-shifting technique."74 As one judge has 
69. On the views of courts, see. e.g.. Szabo Food Serv ., Inc. v. Canteen Corp ., 823 F.2d 1073, 
1077 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Ru le II is des igned to discourage unnecessary complaints and other fil-
ings."), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988); In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183 ("[T]he 
primary pu rpose of sanctio ns ... is to deter subseq uent abuses."), opinion amended, 803 F.2d 
1085 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 450 (1987); Westmoreland v . CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 
1168, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Rule II is specifical ly des igned to deter groundless litigation tac-
tics a nd stem needless litigation costs to courts and counsel."); S. KASS IN, supra note 21, at 29-32 
(59.4% of the 296 federal judges su rveyed believed that deterrence is the most important purpose 
of rule 11 sanctions, compared with 21 o/o and ! 9.6 % who favored rationales of compensation 
and punishment, respectively); T. W tLLGING, supra note 3, at 22-23 (Out of 17 judges surveyed , 
71 % said deter rence was their primary purpose in im posing sanctions; 18% said compensation; 
and 6% said punishment.); Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, supra note 2, at 1020 (The "vast major-
ity of courts agree that the rule's purpose is to deter <~buse.") . On the views of commentato rs, 
see, e.g .. T. WtLLGING, supra note 3, a t 20-2! (Commentators a ssert that "deterrence of abuses" 
is the primary purpose of sanctions. ); Nelken, supra note 5. at 13!7, !352 (Rule ll is aimed at 
"deterring frivolous fi lings. "); Parness, supra note 5, a t 19 38 (Deterrence is an objective of rule 
i 1.); Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited. supra note 2, at 1020 n.3l (Commentators agree that deter-
rence is the "overriding purpose" of sanctions.) . 
70. Indeed, even where federal judges ag ree that deterrence is a primary goal of rule ll, one 
study showed that "all of the judges had additiona l purposes in mind." T. WILLGING, supra note 
3. at 24. 
71. G. JosEPH, supra no te 26, at 28 (footnotes omitted). 
72. See, e.g. , T. WILLGING, supra note 3. at 26-31 ; Nelken, supra note 5, a t 1325; Schwarzer, 
Rule 11 Revisiled, supra note 2, at 1020 n.31. 
73. In a survey of approximately 300 federal judges, for example, 21% of the judges viewed 
compensation as the primary purpose of rule l i , and 19.6% viewed punishment as the prima ry 
purpose. The remainder thought the primary purpose was deterrence. S. KASSIN, supra note 21, 
at 29. On the tension between compensation and punishment in rule 11 doc trine generally, see 
Nelken. supra note 5, at 1323-24. 
74. Mi ller & Culp, supra no te 55, at 34. 
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observed, "[r]ule 11 sanctions are not ... meant solely to deter those 
who would abuse our federal system of justice: they serve also to com-
pensate the victims of that abuse." 75 In on:.; case, rule 11 was fla t ly 
described as a " fee-shifting statute. " 76 
Other courts and commentators, however, suggest that rule 11 
should serve primarily the purpose of punish rn '=nt. 77 R ule 11 sanc-
tions, according to one court, ~'are not i nten :.-1 ;~ :=! tc rnake tJ1e moving 
party \vh ole' for any and ali damages he or she UHlY have sustained by 
virtue of the malicious prosecution of :a. rneritk ss r::L:.im.' ' 78 Sanctions 
should be "aimed at deterring and, if necessaxy, punishing improper 
conduct rather than merely compensati ng the prevailing party." 79 
The lan guage of rule 11 and the notes of the advisory committee 
do not resolve this issue. The amended rule eliminates subjective stan-
dards for determining violations of the rule and emphasizes compensa-
tory fee-shifting as an appropriate sanction. t\o In giving judges broad 
discretion to determine appropriate sanctions, however, the amend-
ments leave considerable room for punitive goals. Furthermore, the 
advisory committee notes speak in terms of punishing violators of the 
rule8 1 and instruct courts to consider subjective bad faith in determin-
ing the "nature and severity" of sanctions. 8 2 
Judging from the language of rule 11, the advisory committee 
notes, the case law, and the academic commentary , a useful , guiding 
purpose of rule 11 sanctions is far from evident. As this section of the 
Note has discussed, rule 11 sanctions serve the multiple purposes of 
punishment, deterrence, and compensation . ~n Judges and lawyers are 
75. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F. 2d 12!. 125 (2d Cir. 1987) (Pratt , J. , 
dissenting); see also In re TCI Ltd., 769 F .2d 441, 446 (7th Cir 198 5) (best way to dete r frivol ous 
pl ead in g "is to ensure that those who create costs also bea r them"); Perki nson v. Ho ulihan 's! 
D. C. , Inc. , !08 F. R.D. 667 , 676 (D.D.C. 1985) ("T he Federal R ules require that sanctions be 
desi gned so as to compensate the wron ged part y fo r th e ex tra effo ri it was forc ed to expend 
because of the wrongdoer's obstructive beha vior."). 
76. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412 , 4 19 (7 th C r. 1988). 
77. See. e. g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F. 2d 1265 , i 28 I (2d Cir. i 986) (noting th at the pri-
mary pur pose of sanctions is "to punish deviations from proper sta ndard s of conduct") , cen 
denied, 480 U.S. 9 18 (1987); Westmo reland v. CBS, inc., 770 F .2d 1168, 11 80 (D.C. C ir. 1985) 
(noting that rui e 11 sancti ons serve a "dual purpose" of punishm ent and deterren ce). 
78. Chris & Todd, Inc. v. Arkansas D ept. of Finance & Admin. , 125 F.R.D. 49 1, 49 3-94 
(E. D. Ark . 1989); see also G aiardo v. Eth yl Corp. , 835 F. 2d 479, 483 (3d C ir. 1987 ) (Sanct ions 
"should no t be viewed as a general fee-shifting device." ); R ULE 11 IN T RAN S ITION , supra note 2, 
a t 37, 40 (arguing against the compensatory purpose of rule 11); Vairo, supra note 2, at 232- 33 
(sa me). 
79. Schwarzer, S anctions: A Closer L ook, sup ra note 5, a t 185 . 
80. S ee supra no tes 21 , 55 and accompanying text. 
8 1. F ED. R. Clv . P. 11 adviso ry com m ittee 's no<e ("Th e detect ion and pu nishmen t of a viola-
ti on of the signing requirement, encouraged by the amended rule, is part of the court' s responsi-
bility for sec urin g the sys tem's effective operati on.' ') (emphas is added) . 
82. f ED. R. Clv. P. II advisory com mittee's note. 
83. S ee. e.g .. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., inc ., 836 F. 2d 866, 877 (5th Cir. 1988 ) (en bane); 
G aiard o v. E th yl Corp. , 835 F.2d 479 , 482-83 (3d C ir. 1987); Lieb v. Tops to nc Indus., Inc , 788 
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unsure which of these three purposes is the overriding purpose of rule 
11 , ~mel this confusion has onl y exacerbated the uncertainty created by 
th:: r ule' s broad standards and varied sanctions. 84 
H. i \ TTORNEY PROFESSIONAL LIA BILiTY INSURANCE AN D 
RULE 11 SANCT!ONS 
The confusion over ru le 11 leaves attorneys fac ing a considerable 
.ri:1'k. :~Ltto rn eys ~ 1ike most people, are risk averse, 05 they will seek 
insurance to pro tect themselves from the risk of rule 11 sanctions. At -
to rney:; will likely look first for coverage under their existing profes-
sio:nl liabili ty policies . 86 Attorney professional liabil ity insurance 
covers che risk of loss arising in the course of rendering legal serv-
ices3 7 Does it also cover the risk of rule 11 sanctions? In addressing 
this quest ion, th is Part applies various doctrines of insurance interpre-
tat ion to the language found in most attorney professional liability pol-
icies. T he analysis in this section is based on the Insurance Services 
O ffi ce lawyers ' professional liability policy form, as well as on a review 
of policies obtained from twenty attorney professional liabi lity insurers 
nationwide.88 Although not all attorney professional liability policies 
F.2d 151, 15 8 (3d Cir. 19 86); Parness, supra note 5, at 1938 ; Note, supra note 2, at 907-09. 
Having multiple purposes is not unusual for a legal doctrin e. Much o f tort law, for example, has 
hybrid purposes . Compensation of the victim is a main purpose of tort liabi lity, but suc h liab ility 
a lso accomplishes purposes of deterrence and punishment. See. e.g.. Litan, Swire & Winston, 
The US. Liability System: Background and Trends, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 
3-5 (19 88). 
84 . Sec. e.g., G. JosEPH, supra note 26, at 31 ("Lack of clarity over goals .. . enhance[s] th e 
confusio n gen erated by unce rtain standards and uneven enforcement. " ); Vairo, supra note 2, at 
203 ('"Confusion ove r which one of these purposes is the primary purpose (of rule 11 sanct ions] 
has led to inconsistent resu lts in the cases ."). 
85. See. e.g., W. LA ND ES & R. PosNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTUR E OF TORT LAW 56-57 
( 1987) (most people are risk averse); A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO L\ W Ai'o' D ECONOM-
ICS 51 (1983) (same); F. STEPHEN, THE ECONOM ICS OF THE LAW 144 (1988) (same) . 
86 . In 1-act. there is some evidence indicatin g that attorneys have already begun to look fo r 
coverage from t heir professio nal liability insurers. See supra note 7. 
87. 5.."cc 7;-\ J. APPLEMAN, INSU RANC E LAW & PRACTICE§ 4504.01, at 309-10 (1979) F o r 
other types o l-losses, a ttorneys must look to o ther form s of insurance, e.g .. property insura nce for 
loss or damage to records, papers, or ot her property. o r director's and offi cer· s insu ra nce for 
lawyers who serve in such corpora te positions. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPR ,\CTIC E 
§ 725 (2d ed. 1981 ). The discussion in this Note is limited to professional liability in surance 
s ince attorneys incur rule 11 sanctions wh ile rendering profess iona l legal se rvices. 
88. Poiicies were solicited from forty-one insurance companies offering attorney professiona l 
liability insurance. T he policies reviewed for this Part were those received in response to that 
solicitation from the fo llowing companies: American Home Assurance Co. ; Association of Trial 
Lawyers Assurance; The Bar Plan (Missouri); Contin en tal Casualty Co. (CNA) (offering policies 
through loca l underwriters in Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Tenn essee); Evanston 
.Insurance Co.; The Home Insurance Co.; Insura nce Co., Ltd. ; Internation a l Surplus Lines ln sur· 
ance Co.; Lawyers ' Mutual Insurance Co. (California); Lawyers Mutual In surance Co. of K en-
lUcky ; Lawyers Mutual Liability Insura nce Co. of North Carolina; Michigan Lawyers Mutual 
Insurance Co .; New England Insurance Co . (Massachusetts and Rh ode Isl and); Ohio Bar Liabil· 
it y Insurance Co. ; Oregon Sta te Bar Professional Liability Fund; Rumger In suran ce Co. ; St. Paul 
F 1re & M arine Insura nce Co.; T exas La wyers ' Insurance Exchange; The Virgini a Insurance R e· 
c iproca l; a nd Wiscon sin Lawyers Mutual In surance Co. A total of twenty-five policies were 
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are identical, sY most follow the same general form.9° Much of the lan-
guage is si1ni lar enough to discuss the policies as a gro up, although 
variations are noted below vvhere relevan t. 
Under most attorney professional liability poiicies, insurers agree 
to indemnify policyholders for a ll sums which they becom e legally ob-
ligated to pay as "damages" for acts, errors, or omissions arising out 
of the perfo rrna:nce of profess ional legal services. 91 Insurers also agree 
to defend any claims instituted against insured attorneys >,vhich may 
result in avvards for such damages, even if the claims are groundless, 
fraudulent, or fa1se. 92 Most poiicies, however, exclude coverage for 
losses that a re outside the scope of the insured's capacities as an attor-
ney93 or that are difficult or against publ ic policy to insure. 94 
In interpreting attorney professional liability policies, courts use 
the same doctrines of construction used to interpret other types of in-
surance policies.95 Most courts interpret insurance policies according 
to the plain meaning of the policy wording. 96 When ambiguities arise, 
however, courts generally construe the language against the insurer 
exa mined ; the large r number of policies is due to the fact that some companies offered m ore than 
one policy. Copies of these policies are on file with the Michigan Law Review. F o r examples of 
language found in these polic ies, see infra notes 109, 111 , 120, 129, 134, 136-139, 142, 145-46, 
and text accom panying note i 31. 
89. In fac t , there are two d ifferent types of attorney professional liabilit y policies - " occur-
rence" and "claims m ade" -but the distinction between these two types of policies is not rele-
vant here. The basic d ifference be tween the two policies lies in when and how coverage is 
triggered . Coverage under the occurrence policy is triggered by an ac t or o mission occurring 
during the poli cy period which ultim ately gives rise to a claim against the attorney . Coverage 
under the claims made policy is triggered by the filing of a claim within the policy period, rega rd-
less of when the ac t or omission giving ri se to the claim occurred. See generally J. F ELIX, A 
LAWYER'S GUIDE TO LEGAl. MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, 13-16 (1982); R. MALLEN & V. 
LEVJT, supra note 87, §§ 709-10. The difference in when coverage is triggered does not affect th e 
issue of whether ru le 11 sanctions are cov.:red by attorney profess ional liabili ty polic ies. Resolu-
tion of this b roader issue hinges on matters discussed in this Part, such as the definition of dam-
ages and the scope of exclusions. See infra notes 109-44 and accompanying text. This Note, 
therefore, does not d istinguish between occurrence and claims made policies. 
90. The In surance Ser vir;es Office, for example, prepares standa rd li abi lity poli cy fo rms 
which m any insu rance companies follow. See generally E. V AUGHAN, F UNDAM ENTALS OF RISK 
AND lNSURA i'iCE 83 (3d ed . !982). 
9 1. See gen erally J. F ELI X, supra note 89, at 17; R . MALL EN & V. L EVIT, supm note il7 , 
§ 705. For examples of typica l policy language, see infra note 109. 
92. See gen erally R. MALLEN & V. L EVIT, supra note 87, § 71 6. For exam ples of typical 
policy language, see infra note 145. 
93. For example, exc lusions often remove coverage fo r property damage or for liability aris-
ing out of an attorney's service as a corporate director o r office r. See generally R . MA LLEN & V. 
LEVIT, supra noie 87, § 7 i 7. 
94. For example, most policies exclude coverage for intentional criminal acts. See generally 
J. FELIX, supra note 89, a t 2 1; R . MA LLEN & V. LEVIT, supra no te 87, § 718. Policy exclusions 
are discussed infra at notes I 19-44 and accompanying tex t. 
95 . SeeR. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 87, § 701. 
96. See, e.g., Go uch er v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 113 R.I. 672, 679, 324 A.2d 657 , 
661 (1974) (language in insurance policy "must be give n its plain , o rdin a ry , and usua l mea ning"); 
In surance Co . of N . Am. v. Adkisson, 121 Ill. App. 3d 224, 229 , 459 N.E.2d 310, 3 14 (App. Ct. 
1984) (insurance polic ies should be interpreted like any ot her contract); Stan da rd Venetian Blind 
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and in favor of the insured . 97 Courts interpret words of inclusion 
broadly, and words of exclusion nmTov>' ly .98 This doctrine, sometimes 
called contra proferentem. 99 is justiiled en the grounds that insurers 
generally draft standard insurance policie:: and that policyholders have 
litt le choice but to accept t he languag"· as it was drafted. 100 
Some courts tak~e a some~;vhat different a}Jproach) interpretir1g po1-
1cy 1Ztnguage according to th.:; rca:.;o ti ~ ~ }J 1f:' expectatio_ns of tl1e in ~ 
sured. 101 H the ordinary policyholder Cl~uld reasonably expect 
coverage under the policy, courts ir' L·,eny :_,,tc,_(es will find coverage 
regardless of the actual language in the poEcy.102 The reasonable ez-
pectations doctrine has led some courts to find coverage even though 
the policy language unambiguously ·exciuded it. 103 Other courts have 
used reasonable expectat ions in a mor-e limited way to resolve ambigu-
ities in policy wording. 10 4 Although courts generally invoke the ex-
pectations doctrine only in cases ·where the policyholders are ordina ry 
Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 50 3 Fa. 300, 469 A .2-:l 563 ( 1983) (same); R. MALLEN & V. 
L EVIT, supra note 87, § 70 !. 
97. See, e.g .. Liverpool & London & G lobe Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 180 U .S. 132, 135-36 (190 1) 
(" [A] po licy [which) is so fra m ed as to leave room for two const ruct ions ... should be inter-
preted most stro ngly against the insurer." ); Sincoffv. Liberty M ut. F ire Ins. Co. , 11 N.Y .2d 386, 
390, 183 N.E.2d 899, 901 -02,230 N.Y.S.2d 13, 16 ( 1962) (ambi guo us la nguage should be strictly 
construed against the insurer); 7 S. W ILLJSTON, A T RE.";riSE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 900 (3d ed. 195 7) ("Ambiguo us lan guage in a policy o f insura nce is to be const r ued liberal ly in 
favor of th e insured and strict ly against the insurer." ) . 
98 . R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 87, § 701. 
99 . Contra proferentem li te ra lly means " (a]ga inst the party who proffers o r puts forwa rd a 
th ing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 296 (5 th ed. 1979) . 
100. See, e.g., Gaunt v. John H ancock Mut. Life Ins . Co ., 160 F. 2d 599, 602 (2d C ir. ) (Hand, 
J .) (" [I] nsurers w ho seek to impose u po n words of common speech a n esoteri c significance intell i· 
g ible o nl y to their craft, must bear the burden o f any resuiting confusion.") , cerl. denied, 331 U.S. 
849 ( 1947); Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 100 N .J. 32 5, 326, 49 5 A .2d 406, 407 (1985) (Courts 
resolve a mbiguities against ins urers because insurance "contracts are hi ghl y techn ica l, ex trem ely 
d iffic ult to unders tand, and not subject to bargaining o ver the term s."); Mathews v. A merican 
Cent. Ins. Co., 154 N.Y. 449, 456-5 7, 48 N.E. 751 , 752 ( i 897) (S ince insurers draft policies wit h 
their ow n interests in mind, "w hen the m e<: ning is doub tful , (a policy] should be construed m os t 
favo rable to the ins ured, who had noth ing to do with the prepa ration thereof. " ). The doctrine of 
const ruing a mbiguous language against the insurer applies in <>. ttorn ey professional liability cases, 
even though a tto rneys m ight be thoug h t to be m o re knowledgeable abo ut in surance than ord i-
nary cons umers. 
10!. K. ABRA HAM, D ISTRIB UTING R!S K: INSU R AN CE, L EGAL TH EORY , AN D P UBLIC P o L-
ICY 235 n.6 (1 9 86) (finding over a hundred cases in vo lving the reaso nable ex pec tations doctrine); 
R. K EETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW§ 6. 3, a t 633 ( 1988) (courts p rotec tin g the reason-
able expectat ion s of the insured). 
102. K . ABRA HAM, supra note !0!, at 102 . 
103. See, e.g .. Steven v. Fid elity & Casualty Co., 58 CaL 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 CaL Rptr. 
172 (!962) (reasonable expecta tion s dictated coverage for dea th on a chartered fl ight d espite air 
t ravel insurance policy's provision of covei·age only for t ranspo rtation o n a "Sched uled Air Car-
rier" o r a la nd carrie r provided by the sched uled a ir C3.rrier in th e even t of an interrupt ion of 
service) ; C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. A llied Mut. Ins. Co , 227 N .W .2d 169 (Iowa 1975) (reasonable 
expectations dictated coverage for a bu rglary despite po licy language requiring that the exterior 
of the p remises show signs of forced entry). 
10-'\. See, e.g. . Evench ik v. St ate F arm ln s. C o ., ! 39 Ariz. 45 3, 67 9 P.2d 99 (A riz. C t. A pp. 
19 84) . 
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consumers, 105 the doctrine has also been used by courts to find cover-
age in cases where the policyholders 'Nere attorneys . 106 
Both the doctrines of contra proferentem and reasonable expecta-
tions provide coGrts with flexibility in determining whether existing 
attorney professional iiability policies cover rule 11 sanctions. As one 
commentator observes, however, "[s]ometimes the -:::Jurts . . . seem to 
search for ambiguities in an insurance policy where Done exist ... . 
The consequence is that judicial techniq ues of interpretation fre-
quently create insurance coverage when policies do not provide for 
it." 107 Although many courts do not actively seek to create ambigui-
t ies or redraft policies, 108 some may well use the doctrines of interpre-
tation to fi nd coverage for rule 11 sanctions. 
In evaluating '<Vhether existing policies provide coverage for sanc-
tions, courts need to consider first whether sanctions are "damages" as 
covered by the policies, and second, whether sanctions fall within any 
of the policies' exclusions. In addition, courts need to determine 
whether insurers must defend their insured attorneys against rule 11 
motions. The following sections apply the doctrines outlined above to 
language commonly found in attorney professional liability insurance 
policies. As discussed below, courts may find that existing policies are 
ambiguous with respect to rule 11 and may use the doctrines of contra 
proferentem or reasonable expectations to find coverage for rule 11 
sanctions. 
A. Are Sanctions "Damages"? 
For attorney professional liability poiicies to cover rule 11 sanc-
tions, these sanctions must be considered "damages'' that arise out of 
an act or omission of a lawyer which occurs in the course of rendering 
professional services as an attorney. i 09 Rule 11 sanctions plainly arise 
105. See, e.g. Spaid v. Cal-Western States Life Ins. Co., l30 Cal. A pp. 3d 803, 182 CaL Rptr. 
3 ( !982); Commercial Union Assurance v. Go!lan , 11 8 N .H. 744, 394 A .2d 8~ 9 (197 8); K ievit v. 
Loyal Protec tion Life In s. C o .. 34 N.J . 475, 170 A .2d 22 ( 19fi l); K. A BRAH,\?\1. supra note 101, 
at 103. 
106. See. e.g, Gyler v. Mission Ins. Co ., 10 Cal. 3d216, 514 P.2d i219, 110 CaL Rptr. 139 
( 1973) (finding coverage under a claims made attorney professional liability poli cy for a c laim 
filed after the expiration of the policy); Sparks v. S1. Pau l Ins. Co., 100 N. J . 325, 495 A .2d 406 
( 1985) (same). 
107. K. ABR AH AM. supra note 101, at 101; see also Tra nsam erica Ins. G roup v. Meere, 143 
A riz. 351,355,694 P.2d 181, 185 (1984) (disapprov ingly not ing that cour ts " find. o r fa il to fi nd, 
ambiguity in order to justify an almost predetermined result"'). 
108. See, e.g., First Na t!. Bank v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 428 F.2d 499 (7th Ci r. 1970) 
(R easonable expectations should not control express term s of a policy.), cerr. denied, 40 1 U.S. 
912 (1971); Jenkin s v. State Security Ins. Co., 56 IlL App. 3d 737, 742, 371 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 
( 1978) ("[T]he ruie that ambiguous provisions are to be st rictly construed against the insurer 
does not permit perversion of plain language to create ambiguity where no ne ex ists.") . 
109. The typi cal attorney profess ional liability policy indemnifies only su ms th at an attorney 
is obligated to pay "as damages." The relevant section of the Insurance Services Office form , for 
~xampk , reads as follows: 
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ou t of acts or omissions tha t occur while an attorney is rendering legal 
services: the at torney acts b y signing a paper and filin g it with the 
court in violation of the rule; or she omits to act by failing to make a 
reasonable inquiry in to the facts and law underlying the paper's asser-
tions. 1 ;o The more d iffi cul t question is whether rule 11 sanctions con-
st itute "damages" as covered b y the po licies. 
Because many policies do not define th·e i,vord ~ 'darnages, ~" 1 1 1 
ri~so 1,vin g thi5 qtv:stion rnay hinge on the piain IY1e2.ning of the terrn . 1 12 
In one 3-:nse of the -;,vord, damages could rnean compensation fo r loss 
or harm incurred by an inju red third party. 1 i 3 The imposi tion of rule 
11 sanctions, ho >.vever, does not depend on injury to another pa rty, but 
rather on a vio lat ion of the ruie. 11 4 A lthough in theory courts need 
not calcul ate sanctions on the basis of injury to the other party , pract i-
cally speaking most courts do base the amount of rule 11 sanct ions o n 
the other party' s costs and a ttorneys ' fees . l 15 Therefore, most rule 11 
sanctions are clearly " damages" under a compensatory meaning of the 
term. i I ~> 
Th e co m pan y will pay o n behalf o f the insured a ll s ums w hich the ins u red sha ll become 
leg:1 ll y ob li ga ted to pay as damages beca use o f a ny ac t or om ission of the insured, or o f a ny 
other person for whose ac t o r omission th e insured is legally responsible which occ urs dur-
ing th e po!icy per iod. and a rises o ut o f the performa nce of professiona l se rvices fo r others in 
the in su red "s profess io n as a lawye r. 
lNSU FL\NCE SERVI CES OFf iCE, N o. G L- 00-23, LA WYERS P ROF ESSIONAL L IAIJILITY FOR!'.t 
(Ma r. 1981) (current fo rm ). F o r a som ewha t broader wording, see C NA, N o. G-42072-D , L \ W-
YERS PR OFESS IONAL L IA BILITY COVE RAGE a rt. l , §A. (Sept. 1985) (" We will pay a l! a m o unt s, 
up to our limit of liability, which yo u become legally o bligated to pay as a result o f a w ro ngful ac t 
by yo u or by a ny en tity for whom you are legally lia ble."). 
110. Cj." Hays v. So ny Co rp. of A m. , 847 F.2d 412, 41 8 (7th Cir. 1988) ('" Rule II d efin es a 
new form of legal m a lpracti ce."). 
l i 1. T he indust ry model fo rm fo r a tto rney profess ional li ability insura nce, fo r example, con-
tall1s d efi n itio ns for "'c la ims ex penses," "'suit ," and ""bodily injury," but no definiti o n fo r '"d a m-
ages." S ee INSURAN CE SERVICES O FFICE, N o . GL-00-23, LAWYERS P ROFESS IONAL L IMliLITY 
F ORI-1 (M a r. 198 1 ). T hose po lic ies th a t d o contain a d efiniti on o f '"d a mages·· defin e th e term as 
·· :1n award o r se ttl em ent fo r mo ney ." See, e.g. , TH E BA R PLAN, No. TB P-2, L A WYERS PROFES-
SI O~L\L Li .. \tl lLITY I NS UR .. \ NCE PoLI CY 13 (hn. 19 89) . Some insurers a ttempt to defin e the te rm 
by say ing wha t ar~ not conside red ' "dam ages. " These la tter ins tances a re treated as exc lusio ns 
for th e pu rpose of this Note a nd :1 re disc ussed in the next sect ion . 
l 12. Sue supra note 96 and acco mpan yin g text. 
11 3. Sue. e.g .. M iller v. Welle r, 288 F .2d 438 , 439 (3d C ir. 196!) (Damages means " some-
thll1g paid in recompense fo r a n in fri ngem ent o f a plaint iff 's lega l r ight by the defenda nt"s liab il-
ity-creatin g conduc t.""); Fra nkel v. United States, 32 1 F. Supp. !3 3 1, 1347 (E.D Pa. 1970) 
('"Dam ages n1 ea ns compensa ti on fo r a legal injury sustain ed."): York v . O regon Sta te Correc-
t ions In st. , 59 O r. f\p p. 708,7 11, 65 1 P.2d 1376, 1378 (1982) ("" D amage is pec uniary co m pensa-
tio n recoverable for injury o r loss s uffered through th e unlawful act , omissio n, or neg li gence of 
a nother." ): F ull er v. Direc to r o f F in a nce, 694 P.2d 1045, 1048 (U ta h 1985) ('"The o rdin ary 
m eani ng of d a mages inc lud es compensa tio n ."); cf Perl v. St. Pa ul F ire & Ma rine Ins. CD .. 345 
N . W .2d 209, 212 (M inn. 1984) (compensat ory definiti on of da mages unsuccessfully ad vanced by 
at torney profess io na l li a bilit y insurer); Nation wide M utual Ins urance Co . v. K nigh t, 34 N.C. 
App. 96, I 00. 237 S. E. 2d 34 1, 345 ( 1977) ("'The com mo nl y <Jccep ted d efi niti o n of the t e ~m "d a m-
ages docs not in,:Jude puniti ve dam ages."). 
114. Se<' supra no te 51 a nd accom pan ying text. 
l! 5. Va im , supra no te 2, at 227. 
116. S eu H a milt o n, McKee, & Levitt. supra note 7, at 525 ('"T he com pensatory p urpose of 
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The term "damages" in attorney professional liability policies, 
though, does not ah-vays mean compensatory damages. In Peri v. St. 
Paul Fire & J'),ftu·ine Insurance Co., 117 for example, the M innesota 
Supreme Court interpreted "damages" much more broadly in deter-
rnining whether a fee forfeiture for an attorney's breach of fiduciary 
duty was covered under an attorney professional liability policy. 
A lthotlgh tl-H~ c ot.l:C~ 1irnited co\,erage 011 other gro u:n.cls~ it ncjneti1e!ess 
held that a fe:e LHf;-::iture was "damages" within the meaning of the 
attorney's policy, Th':: coun found that damages "refers to all money 
damages whether or no~c awarded to compensate for actual harm ." 118 
Under this definit ion of damages, monetary rule 11 sanctions would be 
considered darnages covered by insurance policies regardless of the 
purpose behind their imposition . 
Since attorney professional liability policies do not adequately de-
fine the term "damages," courts may well find the term ambiguous 
and, like the Perl court, interpret it broadly. If insurers had wanted 
the term "damages" to take on a particular meaning that would either 
not include rule 11 sanctions, or not include rule 11 sanctions that are 
not compensatory, they could have so defined the term in the policy. 
B. Are Sanctions Excluded? 
Although rule 11 sanctions m·ay fall within the meaning of the 
term "damages," they still could fall outside the policy coverage be-
cause of exclusion provisions.119 Three common exclusions may elimi-
nate coverage for rule 11 sanctions. These are the exclusions for "fines 
or penalties," "punitive or exemplary damages," and "dishonest, 
fraudulent, criminal or malicious acts or omissions" of the insured. 
This section discusses the applicability of these exclusions to rule 11 
insurance and concludes that, under the terms of some policies, these 
exclusions may not prevent a court from allowing coverage for rule 11 
sanctions . 
Attorney professional iiability policies usually exclude coverage for 
"fines or pena.Ities," 120 but the policies do not expressly state 1Nhat 
constitutes a fine or a penalty . Thus, deciding whether rule 11 sanc-
tions are fines or penalties may depend partly on one's view of the 
purpose of sanctions. If sanctions are viewed as punishment and not 
as compensation, then they seem more like fines or penalties than they 
fee awards , , , renders them more in the nature of the type of 'damages' normally covered under 
profess ional iiab ility pol icies,")_ 
117_ 345 N_W_2d 209 (Mi nn. 1984) . 
118_ 345 N \V,2d <1 t 212, 
119, See supra not e;; 93 -94 and accompanying texL 
!20, See. e,g .. Ho:viE lNSU RAN CE CO MPANY, No_ H35175-F, LAWYERS PROFESS!Gr,AL LIA-
BILITY lNSURA ~CE POLI CY § B.L(b,3) (SepL 1983) (po licy coverage "does not include fin es o r 
stat uto ry penalties , , , whet her imposed by law or otherw ise") , 
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do vvhen viewed as compensation. 12 1 
In the rule 11 context, some courts and com mentators have distin-
guished between compensatory sanctions ;::md fines or penalties . One 
judge, for exam ple, cautioned tha t "courts r:eed to be wary about im-
. " d }, 1 , l ' h "'' l 1 ~ • posmg nnes m1 er t1.e ru e ana urgeo t .at Lt1ne S<Ler course ... 1s to 
limit sanctions to consequential expe:r1ses &. ll d a ttorney's fees." 122 An-
other ju' 'ge refe rred to a sar>.ction '\rnrelu<:;:;d to any such objective 
r· 1 '- '1 r- ~ ·, ,;., ~~ • 1-~ f ngure as expenses or an acLorney s 1ee as a p ·~na; ~ y m i..oe nature o a 
fme ." 123 In &ddition, the l\ii nth C ircuit Co'J.rt af l \upeals, in reversing 
a $250,000 sanction, noted that "a monetary s.s.nction [may] assume 
the criminal character of a fine ... if the amount of the sanction im-
posed is grossly disproportionate to th 2.t torm:y's misconduct or 
otherwise falls outside the: bounds of the authority for the 
sanction." 124 
Statements such as these suggest that compensatory sanctions are 
d istinct from fines and penalties. A lthough occasionally a court may 
expressly irn pose a fine or penalty u nder rule 11, 125 in most instances 
the amount of a rule 11 sanction is based on the costs incurred by the 
o pposing party. 126 Particular ly in these latter cases, a court could find 
that such compensatory sanctions do not constitute fines or penalties 
as excluded by professional liability policies . Even if the fines imposed 
are not clearly compensatory, however, courts could fi nd that the 
"fines and penalties" exclusion is ambiguous and interpret it narrowly. 
The same rule 11 sanction, fo r example, may sometimes serve more 
than one purpose, 127 and in these cases a court may justifiably doubt 
whether sanctions really should be considered fines or penalties. The 
doctrines of interpreting ambiguous policy language in favor of cover-
age could a llow courts to conclude that such rule 11 sanctions are 
covered under existing attorney professional liability policies. 128 
A number of insurance companies, though, have a ttempted to ex-
121. See Ha milton, McKee, & Levitt, supra note 7, at 525 ("T he trad itiona l meaning of a 
'fine' would seem to encompass most citations, at least those sanctions levied as punishm ent."). 
] 22. Schwarzer, Sane! ions: A Closer Look, supra nore 5, a t 202-03. 
123. Eas tway Constr. Co rp. v. C ity of New York, 82 1 F.2d !21 , 12 5 (2d C ir.) (Pratt , J., 
dissenting) (disapprovin g of sa nc tioi1 no t based on actual attorneys' fees). cerr. denied. 108 S. C t. 
269 ( 1987). 
124. In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 11 65, I 180-8 1, opinion amended. 803 F.2d 1085 (9th C ir. 
] 986), cerr. den ied, 108 S. Ct. 450 (19 87). 
125. See. e.g., Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp. ! 54, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (" [T]he attorney for 
plaintiffs is sanct ioned in the amoun t of two hundred dollars payable as a fine into the Registry of 
t his court . . ."). 
126. See supra note 60 and accompanyin g tex t. 
127 . NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION COMMIT ITE ON F EDERAL COURTS, supra note 
4, at 23 (77 % of judges responding to su rvey "indicated that their awards of sa nctions were 
intended to be both compensatory and puniti ve/exemplary."). 
128. See T homsen, supra note 7, at 300 ("[T]he insurance: company, :.JS d rafier of the con -
tract, could have protected itse lf by specifica lly exclud in g 'sanct ions' along with ' fines. pena lt ies, 
and/or punitive or exempla ry damages. · " ). 
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sanctions. 140 If the purpose is compensation, sanctions can hardly be 
considered punitive. Moreover, even the same sanction can serve 
more than one purpose, prompting one commentator to note that "the 
mixed nature of monetary sanctions, which may compensate as well as 
punish, makes the characterization of sanctions as punitive damages 
fra ught with logical pitfalls." 14 1 For this reason, a court interpreting 
an attorney professionai 1iability policy could easi ly finc1 th2.t rule 11 
sanctions do r10t fall wi thin the exclusion for punitive or exemplary 
damages. 
Insurance policies also exclude coverage for losses arising out of 
acts or omissions of the insured attorney that are dishonest, fraudu-
lent, deliberately wrongful, criminal, or m alicious. 142 Courts im pose 
rule 11 sanctions, however, even when attorneys have acted honestly 
and in good faith. 143 By itself, then, a sanction under rule 11 does not 
necessarily fall within the exclusion for dishonest and fraudulent acts. 
To fall within this exclusion, a sanction probably needs to be accompa-
nied by a specific finding that the attorney acted in bad faith or with 
malice. However, since courts need not make such a finding in order 
to impose rule 11 sanctions, it is doubtful that subsequent courts 
would ever know whether an attorney violated the rule in bad faith. 
In cases other than those dealing with rule 11 sanctions, when it has 
been unclear if an insured attorney's conduct was dishonest or fraudu-
lent, courts have held that coverage exists under professional liability 
policies. 144 Likewise, in rule 11 cases, courts may well find that cover-
age for sanctions under some policies has not been excluded. 
C. Is There a Duty to Defend Against Sanctions? 
In addition to indemnifying attorneys for direct losses, most pro-
fess ional liability insurance policies obligate insurers to defend and ap-
peal any claim against the insured seeking damages which may be 
140. See supra note 121 and accompanying tex t. 
14 1. Thomse n, supra note 7, at 304. 
142. See, e.g .. HOME INSURANCE C OMPAN Y, No. HJG58 1F , LAWYERS PROFESS IONAL LIA-
BILITY INSURA NCE POLICY§ C.l(a) (May 1986) (excluding "disho nes t, deliberately fraud ulent. 
criminal. malicious ly or deliberately wrongful acts or omission s'"); INSURANCE SERV ICES OF-
FI CE, No. GL-00-23, LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL L IAB ILiTY FORM (M a r. 1981) (excluding "dis-
hones t, fraudul ent, c riminal or malicio us acts or om iss io ns") 
143. See sources cited supra note 50; cf Cabell v. Petty, 8 10 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(""Ru le 11 does not prohibit mere ly intentional misconduct. Inexperience, incompetence, wi llful-
ness o r delibera te c hoice may a ll contribute to a violation."). 
144. See, e.g., Nat ional Sur. Corp. v. Musgrove, 3 10 F. 2d 256 (5th Cir. 1962) (exclusion in 
in surance broker' s profess ional li ability policy did no! encompass constructive fraud), cert. de-
nied, 375 U.S. 974 (1964); St. Paul F ire & Marine In s . Co. v. Icard , i\1errill, Cullis & Timm, 196 
So.2d 219 (Fla. Ci. App.) (coverage no t excluded where complaint aga inst t he insured attorney 
was ·'grossly insuffici ent " to justify be lief tha t a ttorn ey's act ions were dishonest o r fraudulen t), 
cert. denied, 20 I So. 2d 89 7 (Fla. 1967); Cad wa lle r v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. , 396 Pa. 
582, 152 A.2d 484 (1959) (coverage not excluded despite allegations of fraud and conspiracy 
bec~use attorney's con duct potential ly was not fra udul ent). 
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covered by the policy. 145 Most policies define claims simply as de-
mands for money; 146 thus a motion for monetary rule 11 sanctions 
ld £" 11 . ' . 1 • " h " l . " " d . 1 wou ~ 1a w1tnm tne meamng or t _e term c mm · as roun m a po-
icy's defense provision. 
A lthough the typical policy only states that the insurer will defend 
claims seeking damages covered by the policy, courts have consistently 
held that a liability insurer's duty to defend is broader than its duty to 
indemnify . 1-'7 An insurer may be required to provide a defense even 
\vher1 it \VOuld not be required to pay the final darnage a\vard. l-~ 8 ~\s 
long as a claim seeks damages that are potentially covered by the pol-
icy, the insurer must pay fo r a defense. 149 
For this reason, some professional liability insurers may need to 
defe nd attorneys against rule 11 motions even if the insurer would not 
ultimately be required to indemnify the insured. In cases where cover-
age would be excluded only if an attorney acted maliciously, for exam-
ple, such malice would not be established when a rule 11 motion is 
filed. Moreover, because a court can sanction an attorney without ex-
pressly finding bad faith, there will presumably always be a possibility 
of coverage, and therefore a duty to defend, in such cases. 
As with the term "damages" and the various exclusions, 150 courts 
145. See, e.g., HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, No. H36581F, LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIA-
BILITY INSURANC E Pol.ICY § B.II (May 1986) ("(T]he Company shall defend any claim against 
the Insured including the appeal thereof seeking damages to which this insurance applies even if 
any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent."); INSURANCE SERVICES 
OFFICE, No. GL-00-23, LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY FORM 2 (Mar. 1981) ("The com-
pany shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages for 
claims to which this insurance applies even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, 
false or fraudulent."); LA WYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY (CALIFORNIA), LA WYERS' 
PROfESSIONAL LIABILITY POLICY art. 2, § 2.2 (June 1987) ("For any Claim seeking Damages 
with respect to such insurance as is afforded by the policy, the Company shall have the right to 
appoint counsel and shall have the duty to defend such Claim even if any or all of the allegations 
of the Claim are groundless, false or fraudulent."). 
146. See. e.g. H OME INSURANCE COMPANY, No. H36581F, LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIA-
BILITY INSURAr'>CE PoLICY § B.I.b (May 1986) ("Claim, whenever used in this policy, means a 
demand received by the Insured for money .... "); LAWYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPAr'>Y 
(C\LIFORNIA), LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL L IABILITY POLICY art. 1, § 1 (June 1987) ("Claim 
means: a demand ... for money against an Insured."). But see INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, 
No. G L-00-23, LA WYERS PROFESSIONAL L IABILITY FORM 2 (Mar. 1981) (using term "suit" 
rather than ··claim"). 
14 7. See, e.g. Conway v. Country Casualty Ins. Co., 92 Ill.2d 388, 442 N. E .2d 245 (1982); 
Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Gillette Co., 64 N.Y.2d 304, 476 N.E.2d 272, 486 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1984). 
148. See Pennsylvania Mfrs.' Assn. Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 648 F.2d 
914, 918 (3d Cir. 1981) ("The two duties are not coterminous and a carrier may be obligated to 
defend its insured in circumstances where the damage award itself may be payable by another 
insurance company, other party, or the insured himself."). 
149. See, e.g. National Indem. Co. v. Flesher, 469 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1970) (finding that 
insurer must provide a defense if the known or reasonably ascertainable facts are within, or 
potentially within, the coverage of the policy); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 
168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966) (en bane) (finding insurer obligated to defend insured against suit 
for assault because the loss was potentially within the coverage of the policy). 
150. See supra sections II. A and II. B. 
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may construe the duty to defend provisions of attorney professional 
liability policies in favor of coverage. Absent an explici t exclusion for 
sanctions imposed und,:; r rule 11, the language in existing attorney 
professional liability polici ~s gives courts room to find that the policies 
cover sanctions . Rule ll sanctions serve multiple purposes and are 
imposed on attorneys who a·:::;: honestly and in good faith. They do not 
fit neatly in to i:radit iortt:d p~;}:i c;-/ previsions and courts may -v'.n:ll fmd 
that sorne of the exis·~jng ( 0 \ier tl1e risk of rule 11 sanctior:3. 
H I. THE POTENT U:, L ril?:.R KET FOR RULE 11 INSU RANCE 
Even if courts do r:ot find coverage for rule 11 sanctions under the 
terms of existing pol icies, insurance companies could write new poli-
cies specifically covering rule 11 sanctions. Given the risk of sanctions 
that attorneys face, one might expect a market to develop for such 
insurance. This Part briefly analyzes the actuarial criteria of insurabil-
ity and suggests that special rule 11 insurance may well be offered by 
the market in the near future. 
Insurance operates by shifting the risk and burden of loss from 
individuals to groups of similarly situated individuals. 151 Even though 
risks to individuals are by nature uncertain, if a group is sufficiently 
large, risks can be measured with accuracy. Insurers rely on statistical 
analysis and probability theory to determine the total expected loss for 
the group and, on that basis, to establish equitable premiums for all 
individual policyholders.1 52 Although in the abstract it is possible to 
insure (i.e., to shift or spread) any type of risk, in practice insurers 
only cover those risks ·which can be adequately analyzed in statistical 
terms and those for which coverage would be economically feasible. 1 5 -' 
151. K. ABRAHAM , supra no te 101 , a t 64; F. STEPHEN, supra note 85, at 146; E . VAUGHAN. 
supra no te 90, at 2!. 
! 52. E. VAUGHAN, supra note 90. a t 22-27 . 
!53. The issue di scussed in this Pont o f the Note is whether rule 11 sanctions meet t he s tat is-
tical or ac tuarial criteri a for in,;urabilit y . nG t the principles o f economic feasibility. R isks that 
meet the actuarial cri te ri a are ones that ca n be measu red a nd predicted with som e deg ree of 
accuracy. Even m eas urab le and predicta ble risks, though, must be economicall y feas ible, mea n-
ing simply that an in s urer must be <i ble to make money by insuring them. Economic feas ibil ity is 
not discussed in dep th in this Part becaus~ the ri sk of rule ll sanctions would almost ce rtainlv 
meet all of the foll owing four princi pks uf economic feas ibility discussed in the insuran ce literc;-
ture. F irst, to be economically fea sibk, in ~; urance should not cover catastrophic losses such as 
wars or fl oods. Rule 11 sanctions can hard ly be considered catas trophic in this sense. Second , 
the potential loss to indi viduals sho ul d be nontri via l so insurers can charge premiums large 
enough to recoup administrati ve cos is a nd profi ts. As noted supra at note 3, the size o f rule ll 
sanctio ns and the costs of defending rule ll motions a re not insubstantial. Third , the probability 
of loss should not exceed 4-0 -50%, cr rhe necessary prem iums will be excess ive. Althoug h the 
frequ ency of rule 11 sanct ions has in creased significantly in the past six years, the prob<Jb ility of 
sanctions being im posed o n a particu lar attorney is no t close to 40 -50% . Finall y, insura nce 
premiums shou ld no t be too high, wh ich they probably would not be for rule II coverage, g iven 
that the othe r princ ipl es o f econo mic fe<1 sibility ate sa t isfied . See generally D . B tCKELHA lJ PT, 
GENERAL I NSURA NCE [4 ( llth ed. 1983); M . GRE ENE, R ISK AND INSURANCE 58-5 9 (3d ed. 
1973); G. LUCAS & R. WHERRY, I NSUR ANCE : PRINCIPLES AND COVERAGES 19 ( 1954) ; R . 
M E HR , FUNDAMENT.-H.S Of lNSUR A;,;cE 43 (2d ed. 1986); R. RIEGEL, J. M ILLER & C. \Vt L-
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To insure a risk of loss, insurers must be able to estimate the fre-
quency and magnitude with which the loss •.v i11 occur among a given 
population. 15-+ Insurers will generally b.:; able to d;::tennine this if three 
actuarial criteria are reasonably satisf} ,~d: (1) A large number of simi-
larly situated individuals are exposed to the risk; (2) the loss is defi nite; 
and (3) the loss is accidental ar:.d unintentional :frorn the stand point of 
th·= insured. 155 T.his F~2rt np~d1 i~~ thesE; criteria in ·the context of rule 
11! and concludes t"hat in.sur-~ng against sanctions \vi11 -be feasible. 
Insurance, it is commonly sai d, is based on the 1a'vv of large num-
bers. 156 A large number of individuals exposed to a similar risk makes 
it possible for insurers to predict more accurately t he future chances of 
loss to the group. This also enables insurers to spread risk equitably 
across a group of individ uals . 157 A large quanti ty of data collected 
over a period of time makes it more reasonable to think that the fre-
quency of loss in the past will continue in the fu ture. 15 8 
T he individuals principally e;cposed to the risk of rule 11 sanctions 
are, of course, attorneys, 15 9 and the United States has over 650,000 
attorneys, 460,000 of whom are in private practice. 160 In addition, the 
fact that insurers a lready provide insurance specifically for attorneys 
suggests that the number of attorneys is sufficiently large to make rea-
sonably accurate predictions about liability losses . Not every attorney, 
L!AMS, i NSU RA NC E PR INCIPLES AND P RACT IC ES : PROP ERTY AN D L IABILITY 16- 17 (6th ed. 
1976) [herei nafter R. R IEG EL]. 
154 . See D . BICK ELHAUI'T, supra note [53 , Gt 13 (i"-.n i n~;urable risk "must permit a reason-
able statistical es timate of chance of loss and pos:;ibic va ria tions from the es timate."'). 
155. These actuari al c riteria are not absolute pre requisites for insurance coverage, but rather 
a re guides used by insurers wh en decid ing wh<1t risks to insure. See, e.g.. D . BICKELHAUPT, 
supra note I 53 . a t 14 (The '"requirements for an ins urable ri sk are not absolute.") ; M . GREEN E, 
supra not e !53, a t 55 ('"These requirements should not be considered absol u ~~:. as iron rules, but 
rath er as guides ."); R. MHIR, supra note 153, ::t 4:~ (""T he cr iteria of insurability a re not always 
foll owed rigidly."); E. VAUGHA N, :;upra r;ot e 90. d 28-29. As one ':ommentator has explained , 
"' [t]hese criteria must be viewed as th e opti mum lO :1chi~ve rather th an charac teris tics to be met 
in every instance." R. ME HR, supra note ! 53, at 44; see also M. G REENE, supra note 153, at 55 
('These criteria "should be viewed as ideal standards, and not necessarily as standards ac tually 
a ttained in practice."). In fac t, accord ing to another commentator. "(m)an y common kinds of 
insurance do not meet each of th e requirements perfectly." D. Btc:r. H .HAUPT, supra note 153, at 
14; see also R. RIEGEL supra note ! 53, at 17 ("[i}nsu re rs often write risks that do not sa ti sfy 
these . . requirements.""). 
156. See, e.g. , R. ME HR, supra not<:: 153, at 44-43; R. RIEGEL. supra note !53, a t 18-2 1; E. 
VAUG HA N, supra not e 90, at 22. 
15 7. See E. VAUGHAN. supra nQ[e 90, at 2'i . 
158. See M . GREEN E, supra note 153. at 55. 
159 . T he rule does, th ough, also expose c l i ent ~; to the ri sk of sanc tio ns. See supra note 52 and 
accompa nying text. 
160 . See B. C UR RA N. SU PP LEMEI"T TO THE LA \ VYEP, ST.'.T ISTI CAL R EPORT: THE U. S. 
LEGAL PROF ESS ION l N 1985 ] -4 ( 1986). 
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however, faces the risk of rule 11 sanctions. For example, those at tor-
neys not involved with litigation and those who never appear in federal 
court are not exposed to the risk of ru le 11 sanctions. Jnsmers may be 
able to add to the pool of data, though, attorneys practicing in the 
:number of state courts that have rules of civi l procedure that foll ow 
rule 11. 161 In any case, more than eno ugh attorneys do practice before 
the federal courts to satisfy the criterion of large numbers . 
What may not satisfy this criterion, however, are the data on the 
frequency of rule 11 sanctions. Such clata, where they have been col-
lected at all , have only been availabie for the six years since the rule 
was amended. Insurers are generally rel uctant to insure against a 
new-found peril when they have not had the " opportunity to collect 
statistics over a sufficient length of time on losses resulting from this 
peril. " 162 Moreover, with rule 11 doctrine and practice in flu x, it may 
be harder for insurers to predict future sanction rates based on past 
ones. 163 In the coming years, the rate of sanctioning may increase dra-
matically if lawyers become more accustomed to seeking sanctions and 
if judges become more interested in imposing them. 
A large pool of data spanning a long time period, however, is not 
essential for insurers . When dealing with new risks, insurance compa-
nies make calculations based "upon what is sometimes called ' under-
writ ing judgment,' and in some instances this is nothing more than an 
approximation or guess to be adjusted with the accumulation of expe-
rience." 164 Thus, although frequency data on rule 11 sanctions are not 
as extensive as those on, fo r example, mortality, insurers probably still 
have or can acquire enough information to make a reasonable approxi-
mation which can, if necessary, be adjusted each year. 
B. Definiteness of Loss 
In order for insurers to estimate the frequency and magnitude of 
loss, the loss itself must be defini te and capable of being measured.165 
" In other words,' ' one commentator explains, "we must be able to tell 
when a loss has taken place, and we must be able to set some value on 
161. See, e.g. , ILL. C1v. PROC. CODE ch. 110. § 2-6 11 (West Supp. 198 9); N .C. GEN . STAT. 
ch. 1-A, art. 3, rul e 1 \ ( 1983); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12. c h. 39, 2011 (Supp. 1988); R.I. STAT. A NN. 
§ 9·29-2 1 (Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. 8.01-271.1 (Supp. 1989); WYO. STAT. 1-1 4-\28 ( 1988) ; 
see also Oliphant , supra note 18, at 739 (c iting state co ur t ru les sim ila r to ru le I I in Arizona, 
Ken tucky, M ic higan, W isconsin , and M innesota); cf CA L. C 1v . P ROC. CO DE§ 447 (West Supp. 
1989) (rule following language of rule 1! impleme nted in two coun ties); lvi ASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. c h. 231, 6F (West 1985) (recovery of fees and costs fo r claims tha t a re ··wholl y in substan· 
ti a!, fr ivolous, and not advanced in good faith"); N.Y. C1v. PR,\C. L. & R. § 8303-a (McK inney 
Supp. 1989) (recovery of cos ts for friv olo us persona l injury, wron gful death, and m edica l mal-
prac tice claims). 
162. M. GREENE, supra note 153 , a t 55. 
163 . See supra notes 24. 26-27 , 84 and accompan ying text. 
164. D . BICK EUIAUPT, supra no te 153 , at 14. 
165. See id. at \ 3 ·1 4; R. MEHR, supra note 153, at 41 - 42; E. VAUGHAN , supra note 90, at 29. 
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the extent of it. " 166 R ule 11 sanctions obviously sa tisfy th is cr iterion 
when a court order states a specific amount of monetary sanctions. 
W hen a court imposes nonmonetary sanctions, howe ver, the loss will 
not be defi nite and insurance will be inappropriate. The d ifficulty of 
insuring nonmonetary sanctions, though, need not prevent insurers 
from offering coverage for the monetary sanctions that are imposed in 
m ost ru le 11 cases. 
C. L oss that is Acciden tal or Uninten tional from the S tandpoint of 
the Insured 
Insurers can most accurately make the statistical analysis and pre·-
diction upon which insurance relies when losses are accidental or un-
intentional. 167 Insurance operates best where it is reasonable to expect 
that the past rate and magnitude of loss will continue in the future. 
Losses intentionally caused by the insured, however, are harder to pre-
dict.168 If persons already intentionally cause losses without insur-
ance, they will have less incentive to prevent such losses in the future if 
they are insured . 169 The resulting increased probability of loss is 
termed moral hazard. 170 T his section discusses the applicabi lity of 
moral hazard to rule 11 sanctions, and concludes that moral hazard is 
no more of a problem with respect to rule 11 than it is in other, com-
monly insured areas. 
T o some degree, moral hazard is a problem with any type of loss, 
intentional or unintentional. Insurance coverage may, for example, di-
minish the economic incentives for an insured to be careful and avoid 
accidental loss. Moral hazard is most serious, though, with inten-
tional losses because insurance may enhance existing reasons for an 
insured to cause loss intentionally. 171 
R ule 11 sanctions, however, are not necessarily inten tional losses. 
T he objective standard of the amended rule enables courts to sanction 
attorneys who unintentionally, but negligently, violate the rule. Sanc-
tions in these instances could be insu red just as losses arising from any 
malpractice judgment based on negligence can be insured . 172 
166. E. VAUGH AN, supra note 90, at 29. 
167. See id.; see also M. G RE EN E, supra note 153, at 56; G . LUCAS & R. WERR Y, supra note 
153, at 19; R. MEHR, supra note 153 , at 42 . 
168 . S ee D. BtCKELHAUPT, supra note 153, at 13 ("Intentional losses ca used by th e in sured 
are usuall y uninsurable because they cannot be reasonably predic ted . .. . " ). 
169 . Cf K . ABRAH AM, supra note 101 , at 35 ("[B] ecause insureds can control their own 
behavior, they have it within their power to act inconsistently with insurers' interes ts by taking 
less ca re than th ey woul d were they not in sured."). 
170. See. e.g , K. AHRAHAM, supra note 101, at 14-15; E . VAUGHA N, supra note 90, a t 6; 
Pauly, The Economics of !'v!ora! Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. Rr:v. 53 1, 535 ( 1968); 
Shave!! , On LHoral Haza rd and In surance, 93 Q.J. Ec oN. 541 (1979). 
171. See B. BE RLIN ER, L iMITS OF INS URAH1 LlTY OF RISKS 76 ( 1982). 
172. Ind eed, professional liability po licies are written to cover negligent er ro rs a nd omissions 
of att orn eys. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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However, attorneys can still intentionally violate rule 11.! 73 Some 
attorneys rnay actually peru~ive incentives for violating it. If th .~se ;:;.t -
torneys think that vioiatiEg tb;; rule would help them win a case or 
otherwise advance a clien t' s c:mse, they may willi ngly accept the risk 
of sanctions, even with o:.; t insuranc:.;;. The risk for these a ttorneys be-
com.es speculative. Like gambling or investing in the stock market , 
sp~::c~~tl at iv ~  ris.!<.s invc)1ve t he })C:Ssib11ity of both losses arld gain~ . 1 ~~ 
F or exampi~, an attorney ;vho files s. fr ivolous corn plaint risks sanc-
tlcn. s) but b_e .~nay also gD.in a favorable, or at least a "~!1 1J isance- vs.ll..-~ t, ·t, 
setrlemem from the defendant. Similarly, an attorney who files bur·-
densome di scovery documents may risk sanctions if the papers are 
filed merely to harass or delay, but ht may also gain from the harass-
ment or delay . 175 insurers tend io avoid insuring these types of speCLl-
lative risks because doing so eliminates, or reduces greatly, the 
possibility of loss otherwise found in such risks.! 76 If the possibility of 
loss were covered by insurance, speculative risks would no longer re-
ally be risks at all, 177 and individuals would undoubtedly engage more 
freq uently in speculative behavior. 
N otwithstanding the problems of insuring intentional losses, the 
criterion of acciden tal and unintentional loss is not an absol u tely nec-
essary cond ition. ·while ;' [i]t is preferable that the risk be such that 
the insured cannot himself produce the event insured against or in-
crease the probability of its happening[,) . .. [i]f this condition .. . 
were strictly adhered to, many forms of insurance wou1d be prevented 
from adequately exercising their legitimate functions." 178 Through 
the use of deductibles, coinsurance, risk classification, and pricing, in-
surers can control the moral hazard problem. Deductibles are fix ed 
amounts of loss below which the insured is liable and above which the 
insurer is liable. 17 9 Coinsurance schemes allocate loss on a percentage 
basis between the insured and the insurer. 180 Risk classii'ication and 
173. See In re R o nco, l nc ., 105 F.R. D. 493,495 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (s ubjec tive "' impro pe r pur-
pose" aspec t of rule II). B ut see Z a ldi va r v. City of Los A ngeles, 780 F. 2d 823 (9th C ir. 1986) 
(rule 11 standard is entirely object ive) . 
174 . E. VAUGH A N, supra note 90, a t 8. In cont rast to speculative risks , p ure ri sks invo lve 
only the possibility o f loss . Exarnp!es of pure ri sks inc lude property damage a nd illness. See 
generally id. a t 7-8. 
175. Such an attorney, howeva, wo uld a lso face possible sanctions unde r F ED. R . Clv. P. 
26(g) which covers d iscovery req uests. 
176. See B. BER LI NER, supra noic 171 , 8.1 80; E . VAUG HA N, supra note 90, a t 8. 
177. Th is ana lysis ass um es th at the in surance premium would be less than the potentia! 
gains. If it is no t, then the speculat ive r isk, when insured, would be one of loss o nly , or a pure 
ri sk. See supra note 174-. 
178 . R. R IEG EL, supra note ! 53 , at l6; see also R . i'viE HR, supra note 15 3, a t 44 ("In su rers 
.. write insu rance for which no adequate stati stics a re available fo r scientific ra te m a kin g . 
[and] they write coverage wh ere the loss is not accid ental .... "). 
179. See K. ABRAH .. \t-:1. supra note 101 , at 2. 
180. For exa mpl e, unde r a policy in w hic h an in surer ag rees to ind emnify on ly 70% of the 
losses, the insmed wo ul d bea r 30 % Sec id. 
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pricing often go hand in hand: cbssiiied by indi·vidual characteristics 
or past experience, the riskier insureds' conduct, the higher are their 
premiums. 18 1 Thc::se dc:vic:e3 as :3tU ~ th:,->.t insured persons retain finan· 
cia] risk and are deterred frorn crenting intentional losses. ·with the 
aid of these tools, insurers offer policies covering damo.ges caused by 
,..., , ,-.'1 , ·. t , · 1 +r- ,··1-r i),o..--. ..-:t a-r'.-, -~ --~~ .~:- : . ~ #,. ,-,--~..-1 ?~ ... 1~ .... ~,.., i<:" -..-. - ,-....-..-. , t; .-.. ......, 1 :)2 
3J. ~ .... .r.L In"'enilona 1.. 01 ~,:, :....i...J •  _:. ..... .t\ ~ --~L.:::~. d0d (.lt iu. J.'.. .iG!.J.!.!.. . -t .... iL ..:, .tJ l v .:,..:::cu l\ ... n .. 1. ~ ·· 
Intentional violatiom of :· 
by insurance too; but if not, at 1c6.st accidental ancl :neg1ige.nt violt:1.tions 
of tl-1 c rule can be. The risk 11 :z,nctio:n5 reasonably satisfies trie 
dn:-ee criteria of insurabili ty. A large number of attorneys are exposed 
to a definite risk of loss wh ich the:y did not intentionally bring upon 
~ 1 T ' <"' ; "' · ~ f' _, 1 h • • ' "tflemse1ves. Jlt 1s rorese-eaole~ Ir~ereiore, (nat t ! e Insurance I:t'""!austry 
will respond to this risk by of:rering insurance specifically covering rule 
11 sanctions. 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY AND THE I NSURA BILITY OF R U LE 11 
SM'-ICTIONS 
The likely emergence of insurance coverage fo r rule 11 sanctions 
under either existing or new policies raises an important public policy 
question: Should rule 11 sanctions be insurable? Courts will face this 
question in deciding whether to enforce policies that cover rule 11 
sanctions, 183 as weli as in continuing to develop rule 11 doctrine. 184 In 
18!. See id. a t 15. 
182. See R. RIEGEL, supra note 153, at 447 (coverage available for libel); Note, Lawyers' 
Professional Liability Insurance: Coverage for i'(,falicious Prosecution, Abuse of Process. Libel. and 
Siander. 33 S.C. L. REV. 355, 356 ( 198 i) (list ing insu rance pol icies that cover mal ic ious prosecu-
tion a nd defamation); see also, e.g.. HOME INSU RANCE COMPANY, No. H35 !75 F, LAWYERS 
PRO f- ESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURA NCE POLiCY (Sept. 1983) (malic io us prosecution covered); 
CNA. No. G-42072-D, LAW YERS PROFESSIONAL LIARll.lTY COVERAGE ait . IV (Sept. 1985) 
(defamation and malicious prosecutior, covered). 
l 83 . In deciding whether to enforce inscmmce policies covering rule I l sanctions , courts may 
:ilso face a related jurisdictiona l question. In surance pol icies are governed by sta te law, but rule 
l l is a federa l rule. The jurisdic t im~ a l qc:es ti o n, thus, is whe the r state insurance la w is preempred 
by the federal public pol icies underlying ruie 1!. T he Federal Rules Enabli ng A ct, under which 
ru le 11 was promulgated. expressly states that th <; fed eral rules of civi l procedure '"sha ll not 
abridge, enlarge, o r modify any sub:;tan tive ~ ight." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (!982) . M oreo ver, gr.nera i 
conflict-of-laws principles suggest that f•:d era l ru les that a re m erely procedural have no binding 
effect on sta te courts. See WRIGHT & M !I.L. ER, F EDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 14 !7 
( 197 l ) . State courts (and even federal court s applying sta te law) might therefore not be obligated 
to consider the public pol icies underlyi ng ru le l l in deciding whether to enforce a n insurance 
policy that covers sanct ions. Nevertheless, since the concerns rai sed by rule I l are widely 
shared, courts faced with the questio n of insurability may st ill be persuaded by, and voluntarily 
recogn ize, the federal po licies presen ted by r ui e 11. 
l 84 . T he insu rability question may affect rule i I decisions at two levels. F irst, fede ral dis-
c:-ic t judges who oppose rule l l insura nce will lik ely change their sanction ing practices in a n 
dfort to keep sanct ions from being in sured . ,;,! tho ugh conceivably some of these judges will 
o rder that their monetary sanctions be uninsurable, it is more likely that they will begin to im-
pose nonmonetary sanctions more freq uently. Second, federal appellate courts, particularly the 
United Sta tes Supreme Court, may take insu rance into account in future attempts to ch'fify th e 
role of rule l 1 in civi l litigati on. As d iscussed i>1 the tex t infra. the multiple pu rposes of rule I l 
sanctions make it diffi cult to prohibit ins urance coverage on public policy grounds. If the 
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determining \vhether rule 11 sanctions should be insurable, this Part 
looks again to the purposes of the rule, as well as to the public policy 
concerns underlying it. R ule 11 presents courts with two " competing 
concerns" vvhich are relevant to the question ·;_:,f insurabili ty: " the de-
. , . , l . ,.. d . r1· . , , r .... ~ ... . J s1re w avmc\ aous;1ve use or Lne JU .... IC1 2d proce5s ano _tne oes1re to 
avoid chi ii!ng zealous advocacy." 185 As this Part demonstrates, ins ur-
ance offers a way of balancing the compering concer-ns of judicial effi -
ciency and creative advocacy, as \Vell as of accom:r odating the 
multiple purposes of the ruie. Insurance >NOi_dd nc;t significantly ham-
per the punitive or deterrent purposes of ruh: 11, and the availability 
of insurance: \Vould actually enhance the rule's compensatory purpose. 
1-\.t the same t ime, insurance coverage for sanct ions would give attor-
neys a way of limiting the risk of rule 11 sanct ions without stifling 
creative, good faith advocacy. Before turning to the reasons for al-
lowing coverage of sanctions, though, it is fr uitful to consider the case 
that could be made against rule 11 insurance. 
A t first glance, for instance, it might actually seem that rule 11 
insurance should be prohibited. The federa l courts, after all, are seri-
ously overburdened. 186 Over the past decade, the number of civil fil-
ings in the federal district courts has increased approximately fifty-five 
percent. 187 Last year, approximately 240,000 civil cases were filed in 
Supreme Court becomes troubled by th e availability of rule i 1 insurance, it m ay seek to declare 
pu nishment as the ma in purpose of th e rule, thereby streng thening the case against insurance. 
G iven the compensatory language found in the rule, however, such a d eclaration would likely 
require a formal amendment of the rule . The Supreme Court is au thori zed to promulga te such 
amendm ents under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (19 82) and cou ld amend th e rule to make punishment its 
gui ding purpose . For the jurisdictional reasons mentioned supra at note 183, however , it is ques-
tionable whether the Court has the autho rity to go further a nd amend the rule so as to prohibit 
outright the use of insurance coverage for sanctions. 
185. H udson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 827 F.2d 450, 453 (9 th C ir. 1987); see also. e.g. 
In re R uben, 825 F.2d 977, 99 1 (6th Cir. 1987); Carlton v. Jo lly, 125 F.R.D. 42 3, 427-28 (E. D. 
Va. 1989): O li phant , supra note 18, at 765. 
186. A rguments in favor of rule 11 o ften make referen ce to the litig io usn ess of A mericans 
and to the overburdening of the courts. See, e.g, Dreis & K ru mp fvlfg . Co. v. In te rnational 
Assn of i'-ib.: hinists, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (7th C ir. 1986) (" Mou nti ng fdera l caseloads a nd grow-
ing publi c dissa tisfact ion with th e costs and d elays of litigm ion h<:t ve :1nde it imper<:tiive that the 
federal courts im pose sanct io ns on persons and firm s that abuse the ir right of access to these 
courts.'"). A lthough these problems merit concern, rule 11 "was not des igned as a cure-all fo r 
the ills o f the adversa ry sys tem." Nelken, supra note 5, at 1352. R ul e ll simply cannot, and 
probably sho uld no t, be used to bring federal la wsu its dowa to 2. more ma nageable number. Cf 
Levin & Sobel, supra note 6 1, at 597-98; Note, The Abuse ofR rile !! and Forum Non Conveniens. 
7 RE V. L ITI GATION 311, 3 17 (19 88). The causes of con temporary litigation's cos ts, complexities, 
and delays are related to more fundame ntal aspects of our sys tem of just ice ra ther than to the 
ex isten ce of frivolous claims and motions. S ee, e.g. A . MIL L ER. supru note 30, at 2-9 (on the 
incentives fo r litiga ti on); Friedman, Litig01ion and I1s Disconlen ts, 40 M ERCER L REV. 973, 977-
83 (19 89) (on the competitive an d tactical incentives for liti gztt ion ). Moreover, to the ex tent that 
ru le 1! breeds add itional litigation over sanct ion awards, the rule may act ually contribute to the 
mounting burden in the courts. See generaily Schwarzer, Rule 1 i R evisited, supra no te 2, at 
I 017-1 8 (discussing the problem of so- called " satellite liti gation" over rule 11 ). 
187 . DIR ECTOR OF TH E ADMII"ISTRATIV E O FFICE OF THE UN ITED STATES CO URTS, 1988 
ANNU AL R EPO RT 114 (1 988) (table S- 8) . But cf Gal anter , The Day Afler the Litigation Explo-
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the district courts. i ss Based on a Rand Corporation estima te of the 
average cost of a civil fiii ng, the to tal governmental ex pend iture on 
civil cases last year a lone reached over $3 60 million.189 }-\ t L:ast som:': 
commentators a t tribute a po rtion of this burden to frivolous fi lings : 
" [T]here is considerable opinion , supported by at least anecdotal evi--
denceJ that n1isuse and abuse of tl1e lit igation process have contributec1 
'l - 1 ~ •" ., . ~ ' ' d ' ] " -9 0 'T ' -to t 11e prob .~.e rn toT overcro\veleei tecersJ ·eel< ts . · 1 \ .. tn an 2. 1ready 
overb u rd~:n ed system, frivolous fili ngs and motions ma~ce an ;)_JI\::?.l.dy 
lengthy pt 'J.cess lengthier. They t::tke tjme and. energy a·'?/D.y ~fro:;r: 
j udges ·=;vhose t ime and energy are alree1dy taxed. By un necesssri iy ty -
ing llp the li tigat ion process, those who behave frivolously or abL·,s ively 
res tri ct other parties' righ t to an effec tive process of justice. 19 ' 
Litigation today, to paraphrase Professor Lawrence F riedman, in-
volves vindictiveness as well as vindication . 192 Among litigators, notes 
the chief judge of the D .C. C ircuit Courl of A ppeals, the civili ty of old 
is lost and the accepted strategy is to " ·,;vin at all costs ." 19 3 One federal 
d istrict court judge describes today 's litigation process as "a constant 
flow of poorly prepared, ill-considered , and often misleading, if not 
downright deceptive, papers filed by a ttorneys." 194 
Rule 11 offers some hope for dealing with this li tigation abuse. For 
the rule to work effectively, though, its sanctions m ust have an impact 
on attorneys who burden the court with groundless or abusive papers . 
I nsurance coverage would lessen the immed iate financia l impact of 
rule 11 sanctions. 19 5 If rule 11 sanctions were insurable, an at torney 
could then sh ift the direct costs of a sanction to his insurer instead of 
having to internal ize these costs h imself. In this way, it wo uld appear 
that insurance coverage for sanctions would diminish courts ' ability to 
punish at torneys fo r cond uct that violates rule 11. 
In analogous circumstances, courts have invalidated insurance 
sian. 46 M D. L REv . 3 (1 986) (quest ioni ng popular assu mpt ions about the so-cal led " liti ga ti on 
explosion"). 
188. D IRE CTOR O F THE A D M I N IST RAT I VE OffiCE O F T H E UN ITED STATES Cou;:T S. supm 
note 187, CJ. t 11 4. 
189. ln 1982, the average cost to the government o f a ci vil case in federa l court was :5 1500. J. 
K AKALl K & R. ROSS. C OSTS OF T H E CI V IL J USTICE SYSTEM x ix (1 983). The figure given in t h•: 
text is obta ined by mult ip lyi ng S 1500 by the nu m ber of cases fil ed in 198 8, and it assumes tha t 
the tota l cost would be even higher when adjusted for inflat ion. 
190. Sc hwarzer, San clions: A Closer Look, supra note 5, a t 182. 
191. See, e.g. , G . Jos EPH, supra note 26, a t 257; W a!d, Three Cha llenges 10 rhe Legal Profr!s-
sion. 36 fED. 8. N EWS & J. 227 , 23 1 (1 989). 
192. F riedman, supra note 186, at 985. 
!9 3. W a id , supra note 19 1, at 23 1. 
19L',_ Schwarzer, R ule 11 R evisi1ed, supra no•~ 7 , at 1014. 
195. See I<.. A BRM! A M, supra note 10 1, at 46 (Insurance m ay allow some fi rms to ev<Jd ~ 
liability fo r the costs o f their ac tiv ity.); James, Accidenr Liabilily R econsidered: Th e !tnpacr of 
Liabilily Insurance. 57 Y ALE L J . 549, 559 (1 94 8) ("No doubt the p ro tec tion given by insurance 
ma kes some ind ivid uais callous and every now and then a man will admi t as much in h i,; O\vn 
case. " ). 
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coverage out o£" cor~cern for a d iminution jn f1,nan cia1 punishment. The 
"' '1- inn~sn>- 0 ~11nr-~,-,o r·'"•u··t ;,, Do,·/ v S'; Da, •l Fi --" A~ 1'Vfa•·irzo Insuran ,.,e l Y ..:. t'C u .. a .._, __ }·-··--J..I_~ ......... _.. v 1 ... 1 .. 1. 1 <..../. . • • • .t ...-..~ .• r r-_ "--"- .#.. 1 '- • -\.. 
Co., 196 for examp1e, invaliclared z;_s agai.nsi public policy an insurance 
policy thCJ.t covered a fee fo rfeiture imposed on an attorney, Perl, who 
had failed to _;·~::: ·, ;;ol 2. co:r~flict of intr;rest to h~ s client. 197 Although the 
client su.ffet,~d nc ;;tctusJ darnages f·rorn Per1):. breach of l1is fiduci2~ry 
duty, Per:t \\ - ~t.s -~_; _:· - _j :~red I () f'or feit ·i: o his forr;!er clie:nt tb.e $20}000 i:n 
attorneys ' f~~es ~:he hacl paicL r-fJ1~~ court found that the fee forfeittl rc 
constittxtecl ~ 1 ;_}.ncler the terms of ~Perl's rnalpractice policy, 
but neverthel es:: r;C'ld that such ,:overage v-1as against public policy and 
therefore void. in deciding whet her the fee forfe iture was insurable, 
the court ac knowledged that the public policy question depended on 
the purpose of the attorney fee forfei ture, 198 which in this case was 
''primarily to penalize the offending attorney" for violating his client's 
trustYn Such a violation, the court noted, is "a particularly grave 
matter of public concern" since it undermi nes the trust underlying the 
attorney-client re1ationship. :wo T o permit insurance coverage when an 
attorney violates a client's t rust Viould therefore defeat the important 
punitive purpose of the forfe iture. 201 Hacl the attorney merely been 
required to pay "actual, compensatory damages," rather than a puni-
tive forfeiture, " [c]overage in such a case v;mlld lie. " 202 
M uch of th<: reasoning in Perl could be applied to the issue of in-
----------- ---
196. 345 N .W.2d 209 (M inn 1984). 
197. Interestingly, the lv1 innesota Supreme Court enforced the insurance policy with respect 
to cove rage for Pc:rl's Lnv firm, which was also named in the order imposing the fee fo rfeiture. 
The court observed that "' the policy considerations w h ich deny coverage to the indi vid ual offe nd-
ing lawyer d o not apply with equal force to th e law firm."' Perl. 345 N.W.2d at 2 16. For this 
reason , insuran ce covera ge for law firm s sanctioned under ru le 11 should raise fewer objections 
t ha n insurance for sancti o ned ,_:ttorneys. 
198 . 345 l'-f.W.2d c,t 215. 
199 . 3 ~-5 N.'N.2d c~c 216. 
200. 345 N .W.ld "' 216. 
20i. The Peri court's •.:oncem that it~surance coverage would dilute p unishme n t is echoed in 
opini ons disa llov·:in5 ir:su;-ar,e;; co·.,:c:rage of punitive d;:unages in ton cases . See. e.g. . A m erican 
Sur. Co. v. (}old, 375 F 2d 523 ( 1 O!h Cir i 966); Esmond v. L isc io. 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 
793 (1966) . In Nonhwt•;tern N atL Cas ualty Co. v. i\1cN ult y, 307 F.2d 432 (5th C ir. 1962), for 
insta nce, the U.S. Cou;·t of Appeal s for the F ifth C ircuit , applyi ng F lo rida and Virg ini a la w. 
in validated insu;ance covengc for a $20,000 punitive damages award against an intoxi cated 
driver. T he court he ld. inrL'r alia, that insurance coverage would cont ra vene the "especially 
strong public policy reasons for ncA a il owing <;ocia lly irresponsib le automobile drivers to escape 
the element of punishn1ent in r• Lmiti ve damages when t hey are guili y of reck less s la ughter o r 
maim ing on the highw;_;_y_·· 307 F . .2d at 44 1. Notwithstanding concern s such a s these , courts in 
many other states have ncv•::rthe les:; perm ittee! in surance cove1·age for p unitive damages . See, 
e.g., Price v. Hartford Accident &_ Inclcm . Co., l 08 A riz . 485, 502 P.2d 522 ( 1972); W halen v. 
O n-Deck, Ir1c., 51~ A.2cl i072 (Dei. 1986); Harrell v. Travelers lndem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 
P.2d !Oi3 ( !977): Ostrager, lnsuwnce Covcrugefor Punitive Damages Assessed Against Insured, 
in PROFESSIO NAl. LJ.\ BIUTY iNSURANCE FO R ATTORNEYS, A CCOUNTANTS, A ND INSURA NCE 
BROKERS 1986 549-63 (1 ':186) (li ndin g that 24 sta tes and the D istrict of Columbia have allowed 
coverage for punitive damages. while on ly 15 sta tes have in va lidated it). 
202 . Perl. 345 r~-r.\V . 2d at ;~1 5. 
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suring rule 11 sanctions. To the extent tha t ch ;:; purpose of th ·e rule is 
to punish attorneys who burden the courts v,; ith frivolous papers, this 
punishment \vill be dampened if sanc:tions 2.re insurable. Likewise, to 
the exrent that rule 11 is designed to d:.: L'::r attorneys from filing frivo-
l . 1 1 ° 1 . 1 1 . . 1 ous papers, e1tner oy pumsmng tn.::rn or cy req u1nng tnem to compen-
satt: ::<.ggrieved parties, 203 insurance cov~~'a .ge v1ould also dil ute the 
det :~·rr-::nt effect of tl1e rule. Ir.: sur2.~-~ce ··;vc:'l~ -..~1 .rrts.ke tb. ::: dite ~:t eco .. 
n crfl,i t~ c:onsequ.ences of violatir1g ruL:: : ~ 1 
ing tb~ incentives for being careful 
·>::ve::· .~, tl-)ereby cl irn ini sl-1 ~ 
·;~ :ln p1eacl ing . 20 '""~ 
For th i.s reason, insurance co;,;,;:r.::ge -,vodd p:-esc:nt a problem of 
moral hazard . 205 1f attorneys are insun::0 83<'.inst rule 11 sanctions, the 
m<Hlber of violations of the rule could p;:; tc:oi:i:::.Jiy increc.se. 206 Such an 
increase -vvould confound rule 11 '::; purpc·s:= of reducing fr ivolous be-
havior in the courts. Furthermore, fo r fhose :::.ttorneys who perceive a 
gain to be reaped from fi ling fri volous papers (even absent insurance), 
the addition of insurance coverage could fu rther di lute the deterrent 
impact of rule 11 by removing much of the speculative risk. 207 
Despi te these concerns, the basis for proh ibiting insurance cover-
age of rule 11 sanctions is inadequate at the present time. Prohibiting 
insurance coverage on the basis of public policy should come only 
when a distinct public policy can be identified, and when it is clear 
that this policy would be undermined by insurance. Yet rule 11 is at 
present based on multiple purposes and draws into play competing 
policies. The reasons for wanting to prohibit rnle 11 insurance ulti-
mately give way under closer examination. 
For instance, even with insurance, rule 11 will retain sufficient 
force to deter the filing of frivolous papers. An insured attorney who 
lS sanctioned for violating rule 11 will not necessarily escape all 
203. Any means of increasing the costs of noncc mpiialK>c \V iih ru le ll c:m deter violat ions of 
the rule. ;'>.ccording to economic theory, indi vidu2ls ' '' "!'~ w mc<:·;imizc their utility and therei'or>;! 
t~hoose behavio r that n1inimizes expected lo:~s . T hi:~ thee:' [ )' o.pp·.:::~ r s lD be desc rip tive ly ~1.ccurat e. 
Sec. e.g., Bruce, The Deterrent Ejj'ecrs oj~Au ron;oh ilc lttsurc r;.~'!.' und T0rt La1v: .kl Su rvey of rhe 
.En1pirical Literature, 6 L .. \W & POLY. 67, 91 ( 198 .. ~) (rcs-=a t :.:h i i1d i cate5-J th ;:~ t t he threc. t o f tjnes 
a nd penalti es deters drivers fro m unsafe behavior) 
204. i(. f\HRAHAM, supra no te 101, at 14 ("[O]ther thi t1gs bc: iiig ;:q u al ~ in su rance against !oss 
will reduce your incentive to prevent the insured event rr':'rn ucc urring . "). 
205. See supra notes 170·71 and accompanying te:n. 
206. It can never be known, however, if ins ura nce cove i·agc wou!d lead to rnore frivol ous 
papers, largeiy because it is in1possible to d~finc and m·::as ure fri vo lcn_!sness obj ective ly. More-
over, even if the number of sanctio ns increased after im <F~iiKr: bcr:~wlt ava il able, th is would not 
aecessarily imply a corresponding increase in the amo unt of frivc,io us papers. The ava ilability of 
insurance itself might encourage judges to impose (and la wyer;; to seek) more sanct ions, even in 
the absence of a n increase in the amount of friv olous pa per. c:;. VI/. K EETON, D. D IJBBS, R. 
K EETO N & D. 0\VEN, PROSSER AND KE ETON ON T HF L\ W OF TORTS 59 1 (5th ed. 1984) 
[herein after P ROSSEH & KE ETON] (The ava il abi lit y of in:;urance tends to inc rease the numbe r 
a nd size of recoverie5 in some types of tort cases.). 
207. Cf Ne!ken , supra note 5, at 1325 (Sanc ti ons :c•..: ccl ' '' ··outweigh tl;·c benefits derived, for 
example, from delay" in order to be effective deterren: s ) 
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harm. 20R Such an at torney will likely face higher insurance premiums 
for coverage of both sanctions and malpractice claims, 209 and may 
have d iffi culty in the future finding any professionai liability insurance 
at alP 10 In addition, the attorney's reputation vvi111ikely be damaged. 
The fact that attorneys spend large amoun ts of money fighti ng small 
monetary sanctions suggests that the reputational effects of rule 11 
rnay ser·v·e an i111port::rnt , if not critical, punitive and (le terrent role. 21 1 
~furthermore, ru1e 11 gives courts flexibility to punish egregious viola-
tors of the rule in uninsurable ways. In particularly serious ca~;es , " an 
appropriate sanction" could consist of severe nonmonetary sanctions, 
such as dismissing a pleading that violates the rule, reprimanding the 
attorney in a published opinion, referring the attorney to a disci plinary 
body, or barring the attorney from appearing in court. These non-
monetary sanctions ·,vould have a substantial punitive effec t even on 
insured attorneys who violate the ruie. 
Moreover, the insurance mechanism itself can be designed to deter 
attorneys from violating rule 11. Insurers resolve the problem of 
moral hazard through deductibles, coinsurance, risk classification, and 
pricing. 212 The application of these tools to rule 11 coverage would 
minimize the adverse effects of insurance on deterrence. With deduct-
ibles and coinsurance, attorneys would still be financially responsible 
for a portion of sanctions and defense costs. With accurate pricing 
and risk classification, attorneys would be encouraged to avoid sanc-
tions in order to maintain lower premiums. 213 
The argument that insurance would undermine rule 11 's deter-
rence is simply a new version of an old, generally discredited line of 
thought. "Throughout its history," notes one commentator, "the in-
surance device has been alternately hailed as a promoter of communal 
208. See Schwarzer, Rule 11 R evisiled, supra note 2. at 1017 (describ ing the "pena l conse-
quences" of rul e 11 sanctions, "including injury to a lawyer's reputat ion. investi gat ion by state 
bar assoc iations, and adve rse effects on malpractice insurance coverage"). 
209. Cf Bruce, supra note 203 , at 85 (noti ng thai with autom obile insurance "i t is beyond 
d ispute tha t th e ratin g systems used by most liability ins•Jre rs provide subs tanti a l pena lties to 
those drive rs who are convic ted of acc ident-causing behavio ur" ). 
2 10. Sec RUL E 11 I ~> TRANSITI ON, supra note 2, at 91 (postu lati ng that rul e 11 sanctions 
" migh t well be considered a materia l fac t to be considered in continued coverage" of an a ttorney 
by an insurance company). 
2 11. Cj. Golden Eagle Dist ri but ing, Inc. v. Burroughs, 1nc. , 80 1 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(large law firm a ppealing $3, i 55.50 sanc ti on). 
212. See supra notes 179-8! and accompanying tex t. 
213. SeeK. ABRAHA M, supra note 101 , at 15 (By setting higher premiums for in sureds with 
mo re losses, "the insurer can create loss preventi on incentives and thereby miti ga te moral haz-
ard." ), & at 44 (pr icing and risk c lass ifica tion can effec ti ve ly deter losses); James. supra note 195, 
a t 560 ("'Insurance companies ca n and do adjust their rates and select their risks so as to furnish 
an incen tive towards sa fety."). But see Harrington, Prices and Proji1s in !he L iability In surance 
Marke l, in R. L ITAN & C W i NSTON, L!ABILITY: PERS PECTIV ES A N D P OLICY 46 -47 (1988) 
(The lack of statis ti cal data and information on insureds "leads to too little preventi on and too 
mJn y losses."). 
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welfare and darn ned as a generator of evil. " 214 Fire insurance, for ex-
ample, \vas originally thought to provide an incentive for arson. 215 
General liability insurance, which developed late in the nineteenth 
century, ;.vas at the time thought to e1irninate the "financial deterrent 
against negligent and criminal acts. " 21 6 Yet by 1986 insurance compa-
• . • (j' 1 - · 5 ' . q · . . 11 ... mes were wntmg over ,o, 1 · oJwon m net prem mms annua_ y ror prop-
erty and li abili ty insurance, 2 ; 7 and courts have recognized this 
insurance .not only as comrnonplace, but also as valuable to society. 216 
The extensi :.Jn of insurance coverage to rule 1 i sanctions should lead 
to no more frivolous conduct in the courts than accident insurance :has 
led to acciden\s in society at large.2 19 
Furthermore, even assuming that insurance would diminish the 
punitive or deterrent aims of rule 11 to some degree, prohibiting insur-
ance on this basis would overlook the multiple purposes attributed to 
the rule . Rule 11 sanctions do more than punish or deter violators of 
the rule. Sanctions under rule 11 also compensate parties who are 
forced to respond to frivolous papers. At the present time, courts disa-
gree about the proper weight to be given each of the three purposes 
ascribed to ru le 11. In such a climate of uncertainty, opponents of rule 
11 insurance cannot claim that a marginal diminution in punishment 
or deterrence would sound the death knell of rule 11 . 
Insurance would actually contribute to the compensatory purpose 
of rule 11. This contribution can be demonstrated by analogy to the 
tort liability system, which is designed "to afford compensation for 
injuries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of an-
other. " 2 20 Damage awards in tort cases are structured "to re turn the 
plaintiff as closely as possible to his condition before the accident. " 22 1 
By covering these damage awards in tort cases, insurance furthers the 
goal of compensation. 2 2 2 Liability insurance helps guarantee that in-
214. M ci'.!eely. J!!egaliry as a Factor in Liabiliry Insurance. 41 COLUM . L. REv. 26 ( 194 i ). 
215 . fd 
216. ld 
2 17. HarringiOn, supra note 2 13, at 44 (based on es timates given in table 3·1 th erein ). 
21 8. See inji·u not~s 224-26 and accompanying text. 
21 9. Cf R. JERRY , UNDERSTAND IN G INSURANCE LAW 35 1 ( 1987) ("(T)here is no evidence 
that the existence o f insurance has caused more negligence. There is equally little likelihood tha t 
the existence of insura nce for reckless or wanton ac ts would cause more reckless or wanto n 
behavior. " ). 
220. Wright, lnrroducrion 10 th e Law of Torts. 8 C AMBRIDG E L.J. 23 8 (1 944); see also Litan, 
Swire & W in ston , supra note 83, a t 3- 4: Seavey, Book R eview, 45 HARV. L. REv. 209, 211 
(1931) ("Ton liability ... exis ts chi efly to com pensate an individual, as nearly as may be. for loss 
caused by the defendant's conduct."). 
221. M. FRA~~K U N & R. RABI N , CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND A LTERNA -
T IVES 597 (4 th cd. 1987); see also Ca vn a r v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 552 
(Tex. 198 5) ("The primary objec tive of awarding damages in civi l actions has a lways been to 
compe nsate the injur<:d plaintiff', rather than to punish the defendant."). 
222. Cf J ames, supra no te 195, at 550 ("The best a nd most effic ient way [to dea l with human 
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jured parties will be corn.pensated for damages suffered . 223 Such insur-
ance is "regarded more and more as a device for providing funds to 
meet the needs of injured persons and less and less as a device for the 
protection of the insured." 22" F oe this reason, 225 a number of states 
require automobile owner:; to carry tort liability insurance. 226 In the 
law of torts, liabilicy advances the aim of compen:sation. 
Insurance CO\'erage (Ule 11 sar.ctions -v.Jould similarly 
the compensatory purpos-:: the rul~ . '} .... he Dresence of instlr;:.rr1ce cov ~ 
erage for sanctions conJ pensation to tl1e 'birtjtlrecr} fJa rty 
regardless of an attorn;;;y' s il.n2:::.cial condition. 227 Admittedly, insur-
ance for rule 11 sanctions iT1ay seem less necessary for compensation 
purposes than does insurance fm-, say, autornobile: accidents. 223 Even 
so, courts do consider attorneys' ability to pay in establishing sanction 
awards and on this basis have awarded less than full compensation in 
some cases. 229 If insurance vvere available, courts could aband on the 
extra consideration of ability w pay and could award amounts that are 
fu lly cornpensatory. On the basis of com pensation, therefore, insur-
ance coverage for ruie 11 san.ctions should be permitted, if not 
encouraged. 
Since rule 11 presently has multiple purposes - one of which 
would actually be furthered by the availability of insurance - a com-
plete prohibition on rule 11 insurance is not justifiable at this time. 
Nevertheless, a partial prohibition could sti ll be advanced. Recogniz-
ing that insurance would contribute to compensation, but assuming 
that it would diminish punishment to som e degree, it m ight make 
sense to ailmv rule 11 insurance for com pensatory sanctions, but not 
for punitive ones. 230 Theoretically, this lim ited insurability approach 
could best accommodate rule 11 's multiple purposes. Since insurance 
coverage will advance the compensatory purpose of rule 1 L then com-
losses] is to assure accident victims of compensation, and to distribute the losses involved over 
society."). 
223. SeeR. IV1EHR, supra note l5J : at 155. 
224. McNeely, supra nott 2.14. a t 60. 
225. See PROSSE .R & i<~:::ETC)Y..i, supra note 206. at 600. 
226. !d. at 602-03. 
227. Cf G. JosEPH, supra note 26. at 79 (noting that ir;surance could be one potential way to 
ensure that rule 11 victims arc comvn:sated). 
228. See James, supra note i 95. at 563 (arguing that accident liability insurance has "in-
creased the chances of compensation to the victim in cases where someone is legally liaole to him 
for damages"). 
229. See, e.g., Johnson v. l\k;\'J '{:Jr~-: City Transit i\uth., 823 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1937) 
(courts may take ability to pc:y into consideration); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1231 
(2d Cir. 1986) (rwting in dictum tbt courts can consider an attorney's ability to pay), cert. 
denied. 480 U.S. 918 (1987); Doe v. Keane, 117 F.R.D. 103, 107 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (awarding 
only half the requested fees to avoid "financial ruin"' of offending attorney). 
230. Cf K. ARROW, l!!surance. Risk. and Resource Al!ocarion. in ESSAYS lN HIE Tm: ORY 
OF RISK-BEARING 143 (1971) (discussing reasons for partial risk-shifting). 
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pensatory sanctions should defin itely be insurable. 2 3 1 Indeed, covering 
compensatory damages is what insurance does all the t irne. When it is 
necessary, though, to punish lawyers for egn::gious conr'uct, insurance 
might be prohibited. 23 2 In such cases, attorneys·-- r?,ther than insur-
ers - would bear the brunt of the san;:;t ions. 
T his limited insurabili ty approach vwuld gi ve s;.w : neys the benefit 
of insurance co·verage for t l1e costs of cl:~fc:-_:_ d .. ing :;_"U ~<;~ I 1 n'lotions) 233 
\Vhich ir1 IT1 a 11 Y cases .n1ay "'vYe11 excc ::::d th i~ a.rr;. o J. li~ -~ c<f t:he sanctions 
thernselves. ·v'/ her:. a lJ01icy covers c1 ~':f.:r:.se costs} cfu: iz1surer :has a duty 
to defend any claim that potentiai1y faLs 'Hithin coverage of the 
poiicy . 1Jnder a limited insurability o.pproach, a ny 1ule 11 motion 
ld . . ] (' "'1 . 1 . 1 ,.. 1' . . ld cou1 potentiB.i '/ :u;u.t \V1t 11n tne coverage Of a po.<.1cy , s1nce rt cou not 
be knc·'t.vn u·ntil .afte r a judge issues an order i.f the ~>a:n ctions \Vould be 
compensatory or punitive. 
D~spite these advantages, however, ~i limited insu rability approach 
would probably be unworkable at the present t ime. Given the m ulti-
p le purposes rule 11 serves, it will not always be clear ·whether a par-
ticular sanction is compensatory or punit ive. The ss.me sanction, for 
example, often serves more than one purpose. 2 34 For a limited insura-
bility approach to work, judges would need to make findings that set 
out one prirnary purpose for the sanctions they im pose. 2 35 In order to 
make such findings, trial judges would need further guidance on the 
role of rule 11. Judges would need to know how punitive sanctions 
differ from compensatory ones, and when each type is justified. One 
possibility would be to allow the imposition of uninsurable punitive 
sanctions only when an attorney acts in bad faith .236 A bsent another 
amendment to rule 11 , though, such a distinction could confl ict with 
the discretion the rule grants judges in crafting an " appropriate" rem-
edy. 2 37 In practice, implem enting a limited insurability approach 
·would prove cumbersome at this time. 
Unless courts can develop clear standards :for imposing puni t ive 
- ---- - - --- - - - ---- - ·-·- - - -- - ----
231. Cf Perl v. St. Pa ul Fire & M arine in s. C o ., 3·+:i N .'V .2d 209, 215 (Ivli nn . 198L!) (d ic ta ) 
(:.!c tual , con1pensatory damages flowing frorn at torney's bre:::tch of hi :; fi ducia ry duty \vould be 
in surabl e) . 
2J2. Cf Per!, 345 N.W .2d at 2i5-16 (holdi ng ul' insurable 2. pu ni tive f•::e forfei ture imposed 
on attorney for breach of fiduc i<>ry duty). 
233. Sec supra no tes 145-50 and a ccornp,mying k .:;t. 
234. See supra no te 127. 
235. In some circuits, di s trict co urt judges af·~ a lre:ad y rf:q uired to de ta il the reasons for 
ii11posing sanct ions, e•.:en if not the precise purpose the saJlCt ion i:.. intended to further. See, e.g., 
Bro wn v . Federation of State M edical Bds., 830 F 2d ; ,~29, 1433 (7t h Cir. 1987); Lieb v. Top-
stone Ind us. , Inc. , 788 F.2d 151, 15 8 (3d C ir. 1926). 
236. Such a bas!s for punitive sanctions would cornpon "Nith the bas is fo r 3\Vardi ng punitive 
d amages in to rt cases, where someth ing more th::m mere negl igence is required. See generally 
PROSSER & KE ETON, s11pra note 206, a t 9- iO. Punit ive da m a ges. thGugh, a re insurable iil ap· 
prox im a tely two thirds of the states that have considered th·~ quest ion. See Ostrager, supra note 
20 l, a t 549-63. 
237. Sec supra notes 52-53 ~:nd accon1panying text. 
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versus compensatory sanctions, or until it can be shown that the over-
riding purpose of rule 11 will be substantially undermined by insur-
ance, the basis for any prohibition of rule 11 insurance will remain 
inadequate. Because any prohibition of rule 11 insurance is presently 
premature, it is important nm:v to consider an independent justification 
for allowing insurance coverage of rule 11 sanctions. Allowing cover-
age for sa.nctions would lead to a better balance betv;een the compet-
ing concerns of creative advocacy and efficient judicial process.238 
\Jli th insurance coverage, the fi ling of frivolous papers would stil l be 
suffic iently discouraged, but the chilled advocacy curren tly associated 
with the rule would be al leviated. 
Although designed to deter frivolousness, rule 11 was "not in-
tended to chill an attorney 's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing fac-
tual or legal theories. " 23 9 Many courts and commentators believe, 
however, that the rule as it currentiy operates threatens enthusiastic 
and creative advocacy. 240 As rule 11 sanctions grow larger and more 
prevalent, and as the standards fo r imposing them remain uncertain, 
the risk that an attorney will be sanctioned increases. To reduce this 
risk, attorneys may avoid fi ling claims or making arguments based on 
creati ve, but still potentially legitimate, factual or legal theories.24 1 In 
23 8. I n more fo rmal terms, this m eans that insura nce coverage o f sa nc tions would lead to a 
mo re optimal level of de terrence. A n optima l deterrence level is one a t wh ich soc ia ll y undes ir-
able act ivity, such as the fi lin g o f frivolo us papers, is m inimi zed , but socia ll y desirable activity , 
such as vigorous a nd c rea ti ve ad vocacy, is m aximi zed . 
23 9. FED. R . Clv. P. II ad visory committee's note. 
240. See. e. g. , T homas v. Ca pi ta l Sec. Servs., Inc ., 83 6 F.2d 866, 885 (5th C ir. 1988 ) (en 
bane) (" I f abused , R ule II may chill a tto rneys' enthusiasm and stifl e the c reativity o f liti gants in 
pursu ing novel factual or legal theories ."); Szabo Food Serv. , Inc. v. Canteen Cor p., 823 F. 2d 
1073, 1082 (7 th Cir. 1987) ("Ru le 11 c rea tes difficul ties by simulta neously requiring courts to 
pe na lize fri vo lous suits a nd protec t ing compla ints tha t, a lt hough no t supported by exis tin g law. 
are bo na fide efforts to change the law. " ). cert. dismissed, 108 S. C t. 110 1 ( 1988) ; I n re Yagm a n, 
79 6 F.2d 1165, 11 83 ( invalidatin g a $250,000 sa nctio n because, inter alia. its size ·· pose[d ] a 
d irect th rea t to the ba la nce between sanct ioning imp rope r behavior a nd chilling vigo ro us ad vo-
cacy. " ), opin ion am ended. 803 F. 2d ! 0 85 (9t h C ir. 1986), cert. denied. 108 S. C t. 4 50 ( 198 7); 
Levin & Sobel, supra no te 6 1, a t 593 ; N elken , supra not e 5, a t 1338 -43 (ch illi ng effec t o f sa nc-
tio ns); Schwa rzer, Sanclions: A Closer L ook. supra no te 5, a t 184 ("[i ]mpos ing sa nc tio ns o n 
lawyers fo r thei r conduc t o f litiga tion ra ises the spec tre o f c hilling ad vocacy."); N ot e, Plamible 
Pleadings. supra no te 5, a t 64 1-42 (ch illing effect of sanc tions); Note, R easonable Inqu iry Under 
Rule I I - Is 1he S 1op. Look, an d ! nvesliga le Requirem ent a Litigw11 's Roadblock?, 18 I ND . L. 
REV . 751 ( 1985) (same); Note, Applying R ule 11, supra no te 5, a t 9 11-22 (same); Ro ths te in & 
Wolfe, Jnnov{J[ive A /lorn eys Starling 10 Feel Chill From N ew R ule 11. Lega l T imes, Feb. 23 , 1987, 
a t ! 8 (sa me). As a ma tt er of empirica l a na lysis, however, it ma y be nex t to im poss ib le to assess 
the full ex tent of the ch illi ng effect , if a ny, c rea ted by the rule. See, e.g. . E lso n & Rothsch ild, 
supra no te 33, a t 365 ; Nelken, supra note 5, at I 339-40; N o te, Applying Rule 11. supra no te 5. at 
922 
24 1. See, e. g .. Levin & Sobe l, supra no te 61, at 593 (" [T]he more seve re the sanc ti o ns im-
posed , the grea ter th e ri sk of a ch illing etfec t. "); R o thstein & Wolfe, ,wpra no te 240 , at 18-19 
("A tto rneys unsu re of the bo unda ries o f R ule II 's sweep may begin refus ing to ta ke no ve l o r 
ri sky, but arguably me ritorio us, cases fo r fea r of being persona lly sa nc tio ned ."); Note , Plausible 
Pleadings, supra no te 5, a t 639 (" Co nfl ic ting notio ns o f pla usibili ty, as much as o ver ly na rrow 
ones, ha ve a chilling effec t o n liti gat ion, leading pruden t lawyers to stee r wide of even potential 
imp lau sibilit y by a vo id ing filing nonsta nda rd clai ms.") . 
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an adversa ry system, a substantial social cost develops when attorneys 
begin to argue less vigorously and creatively.242 
Some commentators have suggested that rule 11 restricts the filing 
of suits in practice areas that frequentl y involve novel factual or legal 
arguments.24 3 Rule 11 sanctions poten tia lly inhibit the filing of civil 
rights suits, for example, because attorneys in these cases appear to 
have been sanctioned m ore frequen tly than those in other areas of the 
law_H-> The uncertain t hreat of sanctions may also keep attorneys 
from making vigorous or creat ive a rguments in the suits they do file. 
The effectiveness of our procedural system depends on vigorous 
representation of clients by attorneys .245 A rule so harsh that it stifles 
advocacy contravenes the broader policies underlying an adversarial 
system of justice. Furthermore, a rule that discourages, even unin ten-
tionally, the making of novel arguments strikes at the essence of a 
common law systemY6 The effectiveness and fairness of the law de-
pends on innovation : "Our society is changing, and law, if it is to fit 
society, must also change. " 247 Common law courts not only can make 
law where none existed before, but can " modify[] or replac[e] what 
had previously been thought to be the governing rule when applying 
that rule would generate a malignant result in the case at hand . " 24 8 
Under such a system, the law is inherently in flux and an objective 
assessment of what constitutes a frivolous legal argument seldom 
242 . See. e.g., Thomas v. Capita l Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 885 (5th Cir. 1988) (en 
bane) ; Levin & Sobel, supra note 61, at 593 ; Weiss, A Practitioner's Com m ent on the Actual U5e 
of Amended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 ( 1985). 
243. See LaFrance. Federal Rule II and Public In terest Litigation. 22 VAL. U. L. R EV. 33 1, 
333-34 ( 19 88); Note, Rule II: Has th e Objective Standard Transgressed the Adversary System?, 
38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 279 , 283-84 (1987). 
244. See, e.g .. Woodrum v. Woodward Cty., 866 F.2d 1121, 1127 (4 th Ci r. 1989); Nelken, 
supra note 5, at 1340; Vairo . supra note 2, at 200-01 . Civil rights cases accounted fo r on ly 7.6% 
of the civil filings from 1983 to 1985. but accounted for 22.3 % of the rule II cases d uring the 
same period; in contrast , contract cla ims accounted fo r 35.7% of a ll cases, but on ly 11. 2% of the 
rule II cases. Nelken. supra note 5. at 1327. On the d ifficu lty o f ext rapo lat ing from th ese data, 
however, see T. W iLLGJNG, supra no te 3, at 160-63. 
245 . In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1182 ('" (W)e embrace the fact that zealo us ad vocacy is 
the attorney's ideal. Hard-fought , energet ic and hones t representa tion is at the bed rock of our 
jud icial process.'"), opin ion amended. 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1986), cerr. denied, 108 S. Ct. 450 
( 1987); S. L-\.NDSMAN , THE A DVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCR IPTION AND DEFENSE 44-47 
(1984); Fu lle r, The Adversary Sysrem, in TALKS ON AMERI CAN LA W 34. 35-36 (H. Be rm an 2d 
ed. 1971 ) . 
246. See, e.g.. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. C ity of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Ci r. 1985) 
("V ita l changes have been wrought by those members of the bar who have da red to cha ll enge the 
received wisdom, and a rule that pena lized such innovation and indus try wou ld run counter to 
our notions of the common law itself. '" ); Weiss , supra note 242, at 23 (Creat ive advocacy '"b rings 
about meaningful changes in the law, changes which soc iety requires in o rde r to move forwa rd . 
Unfortunately, I be lieve Rule 11 may st ifle this evolu tio na ry process."). 
247. K. LLEW ELLYN, BR,\ ~ J HL E BusH 66 ( 1960). 
248. Schauer, Is rhe Cummun Law Law? (Book Rev iew), 77 C ALIF. L. R Ev . 455 (19 89). 
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comes easily. 249 As one comElentator noted, "[t]oday's fr ivolity may 
be tomorrow's law, and the lavv often gro'."'S by an organic process in 
which a concept is conceived, derided as absurd (and clearly not 
the law) , then accepted as fi'Jeoretically tenable (though not the law), 
and then accepted as the lm;v." 25c such a legal system, attempts to 
identify frivolous concl-uct, and th:::t ::o punish th.ose who engage in it, 
wiil necessari ly create a ri.:;l·: '.vho 9.rgue for legal change. 
Rather than have attorneys e ,,J;d making innovat ive claims in or-
der to reduce the risk of .• !...il ': 11 :::. 2\nc:tie;ns, it would be better to a llow 
them to obtain rule 11 insuratu::,";. Insurance coverage offers a way of 
balancing the policy of judicial cff'ic:J·ency with the competing policy of 
vigorous, innovative advocD.cy . d·:terrence of rule 11 will still t;x -
is t, but its harshness will be controlle:J. \Vithout insurance, the r isk of 
sanctions may prevent attorneys from presenting innovative, but still 
good faith , solutions to leg;aJ. and 3ocia1 problems. '0/ith insurance, 
attorneys will more likely offer such solutions. W hereas rule 11 pres-
ently works to enhance judicial e:ftciency at the expense of advocacy, 
the availability of insurance v;mdd preserve vigorous advocacy while 
sti11 allowing rule 11 to help strear~line the litigation process. 
CONCL USION 
Attorneys face a growing risk of rule 11 sanctions . The rule's 
broad standards have led to uncertainty about what type of behavior a 
judge will find sanctionable. :Furthermore, the absence of any mean-
ingful consensus over the primary purpose of rnle 11 has exacerbated 
the uncertainty surrounding the: :cul,e. As the number and size of rule 
11 sanctions continue to grmv, attorneys will likely look for insurance 
as a way of shifting the risk of sanctions. 
Attorneys may weli find insurance for rule 11 sanctions under their 
existing p rofessional liability policies. Some of the existing policies 
can be viewed as ambiguous when applied. to rule 11, and courts rnight 
therefore interpret these policies to iDclucle coverage for rule 11 sanc-
tions. Professional liability policies co ver "damages'' arising out of 
acts or omissions of the insured attorney, and compensatory sanctions 
might well be thought of as svch damages . T his compensatory ele-
ment of rule 11 could also i:akt ~;anc;'i ons out of the scope of traditional 
exclusions for "fines or penalties" and "punitive or exemplary dam-
ages ." Furthermore, as judges can and do sanction attorneys for sim-
ple negligence, it is unclear vvhether coverage for sanctions should be 
denied by exclusions for "dishonest o :r fra udulent acts." Given the 
doctrines that dictate interprering 2nnbiguous insurance policy Jan-
249. Cf Levinson, supra note 32. at 369 -77 (d !sr:ussing the difficulties o f assess in g frivo li ty in 
legal argu mentat ion). 
250. Ris inger, supra note 14, a t 62 . 
November 1989] !'lote - -- Insuring ./< u!r:: .! l .Sanction.\· 385 
guage in favor of coverage, courts rn ay well i'l:nd tb;:n some professional 
li ability policies co·ver ru1e 1 J. sar1ct ions. 
Even if courts do not fi nd th<J.t existing professional liability poli-
<::.:ies cover sanctio·ns, in.surance compB.nie.s n"j ay offer ne"·iv policies spe-
ci rl.ca11y covering ru1e 11 sanctions . Rule 11 sa nctions generally satisfy 
the t!1:cee actuarial critcri;;1 for ins1Jr:~1~0le tosses. A large 1 1 ·~; .::obe r of at-
torn.eys ar-~ exposed to ·t ~t-{f: :r .i.s~~ ·:rf s~.:fl_:·: t:i.ons . l~ -h(: 1.c; sse :~: fTorn rule 11 
sa:n.ctioi?.S are definite ar~d ~.:lr -~ :n zrt .n-~c -.:=ss:;tril y i n ten tionc~ l from the 
srandpoirrt of the insur-ed . ,.-L--~he ra i· ~ d o:~r1n~ss of rule 11 s:::tnc·t ic;ns ex-
poses attorneys to an uncert 2:.i. n pote:nf, a l liability on which insurance 
companies may likely ciecid e to capi 'ta1 ize by offering rule 11 coverage. 
T he likelihood that existing or new insuranc~;; policies wiil cover 
rule 11 sanctions raises the quescion of whether such insurance should 
be allowed. At the present time, courts should permit attorneys to 
obtain and rely upon rule 11 insurance. Although at first giance it 
might seem that insurance would sharply diminish the rule's punitive 
or deterrent effect, rule 11 will retain substantial force wi th the availa-
bility of insurance. In any case, even assuming insurance would lead 
to some decrease in punishment or deterrence, it is not clear that this 
should outweigh the positive contribution insurance would make to 
rule 11 's compensatory purpose. Until courts agree on a specific, over-
riding purpose of rule 11, prohibiting insurance coverage on public 
policy grounds will be premature. 
A llowing insurance for sanctions makes sense not only because of 
the uncertainty surrounding rule 11 's main purpose, but also because 
insurance would alleviate the chill ing problem currently associated 
with the rule . Chilled advocacy threatens fundamental values of our 
adversarial and common law system of justice. The availability of in-
surance for rule 11 sanctions \VOuld alleviate this threat, while stiil 
allowing the rul e to regulate litigation abuse etTectively. 
-- Ca ry Coglianese 
